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I. The Personalistic Conception of Nature . . . . MARY WHITON CALKINS
II. The Development of Coleridge's Thought . . . . . NORMAN WILDE
III. Mind, Body, Theism and Immortality . . . . . GEORGE G. [illegible]
IV. Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.
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VI. Notices of New Books
VII. Summaries of Articles
VIII. Notes

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CONTENTS FOR MARCH, 1919

PAGE

The Personalistic Conception of Nature . . . . . MARY WHITON CALKINS 115

The Development of Coleridge's Thought . . . . . NORMAN WILDE 147

Mind, Body, Theism and Immortality . . . . . JOSHUA C. GREGORY 164

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association 176

Reviews of Books 195

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Volume XVIII: by J. E. Creighton—*John Dewey and others*, Creative Intelligence: by Katherine E. Gilbert—*Frederick J. Teggart*, The Processes of History: by George H. Sabine.

Notices of New Books 212

R. M. Wenley, The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris. A Chapter in the History of American Thought in the Nineteenth Century—Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University—*Joseph Alexander Leighton*, The Field of Philosophy. An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy.—*Joseph Jastrow*, A Study of Beliefs and Attitudes. The Psychology of Conviction.

Summaries of Articles 219

Maurice Nicoll, W. H. R. Rivers, Ernest Jones, (A Symposium) Why is the 'Unconscious' Unconscious?—*Ernest Jones*, The Theory of Symbolism. *A. Leclère*, L'Optimisme et la Science—*J. Dashiell Stoops*, The Larger Self—*B. H. Bode*, Consciousness as Behavior—*B. H. Bode*, Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method—*Bertrand Russell*, Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic"—*Edward Chace Tolman*, Nerve Process and Cognition—*James Bissell Pratt*, Professor Spaulding's Non-Existent Illusions—*Morris R. Cohen*, The Subject Matter of Formal Logic—*J. R. Kantor*, The Ethics of Internationalism and the Individual—*Frederic Palmer*, Angelus Silesius: A Seventeenth Century Mystic.

Notes 227

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PERSONALISTIC CONCEPTION OF NATURE.[1]

I.

THE position of this address as interlude in a discussion of mechanism and vitalism[2] has determined its starting point. The first division of the paper will attempt accordingly to trace the metamorphosis of vitalism into personalism and to show that this psychological vitalism antagonizes no justified claim of mechanism. The later divisions of the paper will discuss the philosophical nature and the bases of a personalistic cosmology.

As the preceding discussion has made most clear, the outstanding difficulty in the settlement of the issue between mechanism and vitalism is that each term has been used in radically different senses, often fused but seldom distinguished. It follows of course that one may be mechanist or vitalist in one meaning of the term but not in another of these senses; and it follows, equally, that one may be a mechanist in one sense and a vitalist in another. The three sets of contrasted meanings are, briefly, the following: (1) Mechanism, in the first meaning of the word, describes the universe in structural terms; vitalism, taken in the corresponding sense, conceives the universe functionally, that is, in terms of relation. (2) Mechanism in the second sense is synonymous with determinism; while vitalism

[1] Read as the President's address at the eighteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at Harvard University, December 27–28, 1918.

[2] For the papers contributed by the leaders of this discussion, *cf.* this REVIEW, Vol. XXVII, pp. 571 ff. (Nov., 1918).

introduces the conception of an incalculable and unpredictable controlling force or entelechy. (3) Mechanism, finally, is used in the sense of materialism; and vitalism opposes to it either functionalistic vitalism in a new dress or else personalism, psychological vitalism, the doctrine of the real self.

We are especially concerned with the last pair of contrasted conceptions but it is none the less of interest to us briefly to consider the others. (1) The mechanist in the first sense of the term analyzes his phenomena into structural elements, whereas the vitalist views them primarily as organisms, or wholes, each in relation to its own parts and also to other wholes. The mechanist, for example, analyzes the living cell into chemical elements, whereas the vitalist conceives it as an organic unit and studies its function in muscular or circulatory adjustment. Mechanism and vitalism thus defined are, however, not antagonistic conceptions. Nor is the first an exclusively physical, the second a purely biological category. On the contrary, biology must use structural categories and "every principle of chemical science" must apply "to organic . . . substances"[1] since every organism is a carbon compound as well as an animal or plant. And conversely, as Professor Henderson has argued, inorganic as well as organic bodies are incompletely described unless they are described in terms of their fitness and order as well as in terms of their physical and chemical constituents.

(2) In the second sense of each term mechanism and vitalism stand in sharp and irreconcilable opposition. Mechanism, in this meaning of the word, is simply a synonym for determinism, the theory which assumes such a perfectly determinate relation between phenomena that none can vary in independence of the rest. To this conception, vitalism (in its extreme form) opposes the hypothesis of an entelechy or vital entity which, at one point or another in the succession of phenomena, "actively intervenes in the processes of organisms"[2] and interferes in the otherwise determined succession of events. Here then we have a complete disjunction. Mechanism and vitalism thus conceived

[1] L. F. Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, p. 192[1].

[2] H. S. Jennings, "Doctrines Held as Vitalism," *American Naturalist*, XLVII, 402[2].

are no longer supplementary conceptions but utterly incompatible points of view: On the one hand the conception of series of phenomena, determined and (so far as they are temporal) predictable. On the other hand, the conception of inscrutable, irregularly interrupting entities and only apparent predictableness and uniformity. Between the two it is evidently necessary to make choice; and unquestionably, in my view, the mechanists score. For the truth is that the experimental arguments against mechanism—Driesch's arguments, for example, from the phenomena of development and restitution—fall far short of proving that "something new and elemental must be introduced" to account for the facts.[1] The indeterministic vitalist, the entelechist as we may call him, is therefore unjustified in his refusal to play the game through. He makes the deterministic postulate of causally related phenomena in the case of physical bodies and cavalierly abandons it when he studies organisms. Science, on the other hand, must postulate a universe of law, and experimental science must postulate a rigid determinism, a future which is uniform with the past.

It is important, however, to emphasize once more the fact that this rejection of entelechistic vitalism involves no break with vitalism in the first, the functionalistic sense already justified. Such functionalistic vitalism is indeed perfectly compatible with deterministic mechanism. Protoplasm, for example, biologically regarded as sensitive or irritable, as well as protoplasm conceived as a carbon compound, may be conceived as determined; or, to take another illustration, the restitution of a cerebral function as truly as a molecular change may be regarded as completely predictable. Such an acceptance, it must be noted, of determinism in science, simply leaves open the philosophical question whether or not the world is ultimately a determined universe.

(3) Mechanism in the third sense of the term is a philosophical rather than a scientific doctrine. It defines all phenomena, psychic as well as biologic, in physical terms, and by physical it means not the molecular or atomic but the non-mental and the

[1] *Cf.* H. S. Jennings, "Mechanism and Vitalism," this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, pp. 585 ff.

non-ideal. Loeb and Warren may be named as upholders of this type of mechanism, though Professor Warren states (in the paper written for our discussion) that the evidence for the theory is not demonstrative.[1] It conceives "conscious experiences" as "identical with . . . neural processes";[2] and unambiguously states that "all human activity, including deliberation and selective volition, is completely mechanistic";[3] and that "this mechanism is physicochemical in type." Mechanism, in this final sense of the term, it should be noticed, though of course it involves both structural and deterministic mechanism, is not in turn implied by either conception. In concrete terms: one may describe phenomena in structural terms and may conceive science in the determinist's fashion, without believing that the world is ultimately non-mental in its nature.

The most effective opposition to this materialistic mechanism comes from what may well be termed psychological vitalism. The psychological vitalist stresses the fact that there exist in addition to whatever elements and unconscious organisms the world may contain, conscious beings who not only secrete and digest and react in response to environment but who also perceive and remember, desire and wish, prefer and choose. To assert that purposes and emotions and memories are phenomena of the same order as vibrations and chemical reactions is, he points out, to misstate or to ignore facts open to immediate experience. For we know by direct observation what we mean by deliberating and willing, feeling and remembering; and we know that we do not mean by deliberation and the rest what we mean by vibrations and combustions. That such physicochemical phenomena may accompany, condition, or even take the place of deliberation, emotion or memory, the psychological vitalist does not deny; he merely insists on the observed fact that consciousness is not identical with the mechanical or the chemical or the electrical phenomena. An emotion of fear, for example, may well be due to a sudden and intense excitation of a

[1] H. C. Warren, "Mechanism versus Vitalism in the Domain of Psychology," this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, p. 608[2].

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 604.

[3] *Journal of Philosophy*, August, 1918, XV, p. 464[3].

man's first temporal convolutions; but "being afraid of a thunder clap" is a phenomenon distinguishable from this excitation, however dependent on them.

Psychological vitalism, in a word, charges materialistic mechanism with a theoretic prepossession which obscures the plain facts of observation and uncritically identifies interrelated but distinct facts—conscious experiences and neural processes. To quote Jennings: "At least some living things present the phenomena of 'conscious states.' There is practically complete agreement that these are not analyzable into nothing but configurations and motions. . . . If this be admitted it is clear that mechanism in its more inclusive form is not correct for the living; they are not '*nothing but*' configuration and motion."[1]

This comparison of the claims of mechanism and vitalism culminates accordingly in a conception of the universe which, while it is frankly opposed both to vitalism as indeterministic doctrine of entelechies and to functional vitalism viewed as exclusively biological conception, is anti-mechanistic in the sense of being anti-materialistic. It is the psychologically vitalistic, the personalistic, conception of the universe as, in part at least, constituted by related selves. To the study of this personalistic doctrine this paper is devoted. It is however necessary, for the time being, to turn aside from the main purpose of the argument and to explore a dangerous *cul de sac* into which brilliant adventurers are tempting us. The alluring by-path against which I would warn you is that of so-called teleological vitalism, ordinarily adopted as an idealistic protest against materialistic mechanism. This view is represented in our discussion by Professor Hoernlé,[2] and is obviously a form of functional vitalism with stress on the purposive type of the relations of organisms to their environment. According to the teleological vitalist, "life cannot be formulated in physico-chemical terms." On the contrary, "the phenomena of life" need to be dealt with first and foremost in their own "terms." And these prove to be 'teleological' terms—terms of 'value.' "Wherever," Mr. Hoernlé

[1] *Op. cit.*, this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, p. 594 [2].

[2] Hoernlé, however, eschews the term vitalism and speaks of teleology.

says, "the facts challenge us to say not merely that *B* is the effect of *A*, but that *B* is the *reason why* or *that for the sake of which A* exists or occurs, there we have the *immanent purposiveness* of living things."[1]

As they stand, these statements may not seem to contain a challenge. For, on the one hand, value and purposiveness, superficially regarded, may appear to be cases of the functional relations already admitted as categories of scientific description, —an interpretation favored by the fact that the arguments put forward for teleological vitalism are mere repetitions of the old contention that science needs functional as well as structural categories. And though, more closely considered, value and purposiveness turn out to be characters radically different from organic relations, they seem, from this more adequate point of view, to be personal categories; and accordingly, teleological vitalism seems to be a mere corollary or application of personalism. Against this last interpretation, however, the teleologists vociferously protest. "When I speak of teleological concepts," Hoernlé says, "I do not mean a design, or plan, or purpose or desire consciously entertained by any mind, be it of God, of man, of animal, or of plant."[2] The language of teleology must, indeed, he holds, be purged of these associations since they make it "unwelcome to scientists, and are not required by the facts."[3] Teleological vitalism is, in other words, formulated in opposition as much to personalism as to materialistic mechanism. The personalist, accordingly, must turn critic of this teleological form of vitalism. And his criticism takes shape somewhat as follows: Like Philonous, he insists that terms shall be either defined or shown to be indefinable. But he seldom, if ever, finds, in the pages of the teleologists, even an attempt to state what they mean by purposiveness, value, or the relation of means to end. Illustrations he finds in plenty of purposive actions—references to the bee seeking her home, the moth laying her eggs, the animal devouring food—but he discovers no efforts to analyze and delimit purposiveness and value. Evidently the

[1] "Mechanism and Vitalism," this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, p. 643.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 632[1].

[3] *Ibid.* p. 642[2].

teleologist accepts the terms at their face value as irreducible data. Against this conception of value and purposiveness as indefinable and ultimate but non-conscious characters dominant in the organic world, personalism protests that value and purposiveness, far from being further irreducible, are in fact definable in necessarily personal terms. 'Purposive' means 'pertaining to purpose' and purpose implies 'purposing,' the experience of a 'purposer.' Were there no purposer there could be no purposing, and hence no character-pertaining-to purposing, that is, no purposiveness. Similarly, value is what is valued, that is either wished or willed by a valuer. Without such a valuing self the highly abstract conception of value—the character common to all valuings—would be absolutely meaningless.

In comment on this conception of value, teleological vitalists admit willing and wishing as one class of values, but they protest that countless purposive actions—food-getting and egg-laying, for example—have not been preceded by any conscious design. Here, the teleologist exclaims, are clear cases of unconscious purposiveness or value. But this protest naïvely ignores the on-looking scientist for whom alone the terms 'beneficial,' 'function' and 'value'—so far as they do not belong to somebody's immediate experience—have meaning. The unpurposed egg-laying has indeed value. But value for whom? The question is inevitable, for the word is a transitive verbal adjective. And if we abstract from the possible but unproved satisfaction of the reproduced living being, maintenance of structure is beneficial only from the standpoint of the scientist's interest in a regularly and progressively developing world.

The neo-teleologists, in a word, in their "anxiety not to compromise themselves" with the old-fashioned anthropomorphists, have committed what Hylas describes as "a pleasant mistake enough." As they were thinking of an unpurposed value, where no one was desiring it, they believed that they were conceiving a value as existing unpurposed, not considering that they themselves were valuing it all the time.

The personalist is, accordingly, justified in his rejection of teleological vitalism as recourse from materialism—in his protest

against abstract values, which by hypothesis nobody values, against the means and ends which are means and ends to no one, against the purposivenesses which are in no sense purposes! Teleological vitalism, he insists, reduces to psychological vitalism. There are values, there is purposiveness—but only because there are conscious beings who value, that is wish or will or enjoy, and who purpose. In a word, teleologism is merely an abstraction from the psychological, or personal, vitalism to which the argument has led us. Even those purposive actions which are unpurposed by the actors imply the existence of selves. The real world, therefore, the world of physical and chemical substances, is certainly also a world of selves.

II.[1]

The conception of the world, achieved in the first division of this paper, as made up in part, at least, of conscious beings, or selves, is not yet a fully personalistic conception of nature. For a completely personalistic doctrine must maintain, not that selves exist along with other real though non-mental beings, but that the world consists wholly of persons, or selves; and that so large a part of the world is accounted impersonal simply because the selves in whom it consists are undistinguished and uncomprehended. This paper espouses the fully personalistic conception of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves, or persons, of different levels and degrees, more or less closely related to each other. To establish this conception would demand the proof first (1) that supposedly non-mental beings are really mental; second (2) that mental beings are inevitably personal; third (3) that more than one self may be known to exist. In negative terms, the thorough-going personalist, before he has a philosophic right to his cosmology, must successfully maintain first (1) idealism against both dualism and materialism; second (2) personalism against ideistic idealism; third (3) a non-solipsistic, a non-subjective, form of personalism. The limits of this paper prohibit the adequate carrying out of any part of this program, but the following may serve to suggest the main outlines of the personalistic argument.

[1] Part II was omitted from this paper as read.

1. The personalist as idealist begins by protesting against the common practice of dismissing his case before it is heard—in other words against the naïve assumption that the physical world as we know it by observation is material in the sense of being non-mental and independent of mind. The idealist, like every other metaphysician, unreservedly accepts at their face value facts of every description—facts such as redness, hotness and oscillation as well as facts such as likeness, connectedness and uniformity. He therefore begins where "common sense and science . . . begin, without any doubts concerning the reality of the world."[1] Whoever, however, identifies the statement that the physical world is real with the assertion that it is *ipso facto* non-mental is not, the idealist insists, arguing against idealism; he is simply postulating or assuming the conclusion which the idealist insists on putting to metaphysical test.

By idealism is here meant frankly what is sometimes called mentalism, the doctrine that any reality—electron, brain, protoplasm as well as self or purpose—is mental.[2] Stripped of unessential features[3] the argument for mentalism emphasizes the fact, never disproved nor seriously disputed, that the only unchallengeable assertions about alleged material, *i. e.*, non-mental, reality, are assertions of somebody's way of being conscious. I say, for example, that the sea is blue; you insist that it is green; my only certainty, but an impregnable certainty, is that I have the experience which I call seeing blue, not the experience which I call seeing green!

This argument, oddly enough, has never been better stated than by that peculiarly omniscient neo-realist, Bertrand Russell. In the third lecture of his *Scientific Methods of Philosophy*

[1] J. E. Creighton, "Two Types of Idealism," this REVIEW, 1917, XVI, p. 525. *Cf.* pp. 533[2] ff.

[2] This conception of idealism is sharply opposed to the 'objective idealism,' as it is sometimes called, which consists in the "direct acceptance of things as having value or significance." *Cf.* Creighton, *op. cit.*, p. 515[2].

[3] In the face of contemporary criticism it is important to remind the reader that no serious idealist from Berkeley downward rests his case either (1) on the primary-secondary qualities argument or (2) on the argument from illusion. The first of these, the idealist is well aware, may cut either way. (*Cf.* Berkeley, *Principles*, XV, and May Sinclair, *A Defense of Idealism*, p. 175[2].) The second he regards as decisive against many forms of realism, not as conclusive for idealism.

for example, in the effort to tell "what is known . . . without any element of hypothesis," Russell says definitely: "What we know by experience," in viewing a table, "what is really known, is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations." This is, in its essence, precisely the basal position of idealism. Russell, to be sure, at once supplements his "really known" sensations by extra-mental sense-data.[1] And other neo-realists cavalierly dispose of the argument that unchallengeable statements about physical objects are all in mental terms by the remark that some unchallengeable assertions are trivial.[2] They do not, however, offer any proof that the idealist's unchallengeable assertion belongs with the trivial certainties. Accordingly, the idealist is still free to urge his fundamental thesis. If, he insists, the attempt to reach irrefragable certainty about alleged non-mental reality inevitably issues in mental and not in non-mental certainties, the philosopher is in honor bound first, to stop identifying the physical with the non-mental and second, to set down the alleged non-mental as, at the least, negligible for plain man and philosopher alike.

2. The personalist has next to argue for personal idealism. The idealistic conception of the world as mental does not, in the view of all philosophers, imply that it is also personal. On the contrary, a group of idealists—impersonal idealists, ideists or phenomenalists as they are called—follow Hume in conceiving the universe as through and through mental but impersonal, as consisting of a succession of mental contents or processes, psychic items or states. According to Karl Pearson and Ernst Mach, for example, well-known representatives of the school of mechanistic idealists, the world of nature with which science deals reduces to the ordered succession of ideas in the scientist's mind; and the laws of nature are the scientist's way of grouping and predicting phenomena. Pearson, for example, describes matter as a "union of immediate sense impressions with associated impressions."[3]

[1] His only argument, so far as I can find, for the existence of the sense datum, is based on the involuntariness of sensation. (*Op cit.*, p. 76.) The argument is indecisive since the involuntariness is stateable in personalistic terms also.

[2] *Cf. The New Realism*, pp. 19–20. (Macmillan Co., 1912.)

[3] *The Grammar of Science*, second edition, p. 75[2].

The personalist has therefore to justify his rejection of ideism, this conception of the world as a great complex of succeeding mental states. The basal objection to the theory is that, thoroughly understood, it implies the very conception which it opposes. For when, accepting at its face value the ideistic theory, one asks the meaning of the statements: "This or that nature object is a complex idea"; "the course of nature is a series of ideas;" "the law of nature is an experienced routine"—one finds that there are no really, independently existing ideas, that an idea, that is, a mental experience, always is part of a self, who has the idea, who experiences. In a word, the selfless or impersonal idea, like the impersonal value, is an abstraction from the concretely real self. The world, as mental, inevitably is a world made up not of ideas, or mental processes, but of selves.

The personalist is well aware that the foregoing paragraph constitutes no argument. Indeed, in the nature of the case, no argument is possible. As ultimately real, the self cannot be proved through being bolstered up by something more real; it is simply discovered, immediately known. Yet the personalist is not without resource in face of any Hume, past or present, who protests naïvely: "When I enter into myself . . . I can never catch myself."[1] For such a protest overlooks the significant fact, stressed by Augustine and Descartes,[2] that self is the one reality whose existence can neither be denied nor doubted, since neither denial nor doubt are possible without a self to do the denying or the doubting. I may question or deny the existence of God or of my brother or of my breakfast without thereby implying the existence of any one of them, but as soon as I question or deny myself—*ecco*, I myself questioning or denying! The personalist has accordingly a right to assert the existence of the self which experiences and "has ideas."

3. Even with this conception of the world as personal we have

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Part IV, Section VI.

[2] *Cf.* Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 3, *De Trinitate*, X, 10, and XV, 12, 26; and Descartes, *Meditations*, II, *Principles of Philosophy*, I, 7. Descartes's self-doctrine is too often confused (by himself as well as by his critics) with his more mediæval conception of the soul.

not, it must next be pointed out, achieved the fully personalistic conception of the world as a society of interrelated conscious beings, or selves. For directly in the path toward such a conception looms the specter of solipsism: the conception of the world as personal, to be sure, but as narrowed to the confines of myself, the only undoubtable, immediately known self. Thus conceived, solipsistic or subjective personalism as a nature philosophy differs little from impersonal idealism, or ideism. For if only I myself can be metaphysically known to exist, then the physical universe—plants and stars and evolving forms of life—must reduce to a mere system of ideas in a single mind—my mind, the mind which (on this hypothesis) constitutes reality. Now, according to the realistic critic,[1] solipsism is the only valid form of idealistic personalism. My certainty of the self, he reminds me, is rooted in my introspective discovery that I cannot doubt my own existence; the argument against alleged extra-mental reality pivots on the fact that what I know is my experience. Obviously, the critic insists, the only certainty here is that of myself, of the solitary me, and of my individual experience. Were it necessary to accept this conclusion each of us would accordingly be shut up to the philosophic conception of the universe as a system of his own ideas exclusively.[2] A careful consideration of this criticism would, therefore, be the logically next step of this paper. But limits of time prevent this undertaking save in schematic outline. In brief: the personalist holds that the object of my alleged knowledge alike of other-self and of thing is *both* my own experience, or idea, and *something-beside*. The personalist justifies himself in asserting the existence of this something-beside-me on the ground that I directly experience

[1] *Cf* G. E. Moore, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1905–06, VI, "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception"; *cf.* also, *The New Realism*, 1912, pp. 146^{2}–147^{1}. It is not without interest to add that, some two hundred years before the rise of neo-realism, Berkeley put a closely similar argument into the mouth of Hylas. *Cf.* the third of the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, the passage beginning: "Answer me Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings?" (The personalist agrees with the realist in discrediting Philonous's handling of the situation.)

[2] Most neo-realists, on the other hand, unjustifiably imply that to prove idealism solipsistic would *ipso facto* discredit it.

myself as a limited, hampered self—limited in my perceptual experience to just these special seeings and hearings, and limited also in my personal disappointments and in my baffled purposes. But a direct experience of being limited is, as Fichte long ago suggested, a direct (not an inferred) knowledge of something existing beyond the limit. When, therefore (to repeat the old illustration), I perceive the sea as blue, my only unchallengeable certainty *about the blueness* is indeed my own consciousness, but I have also the certainty of being limited to just this sensation of blueness; and this direct experience of being limited includes in it the knowledge of a something-besides-me. But this conclusion constitutes the first step only of the personalist's refutation of solipsism. He has still to show reason why the something-besides-me must be conceived as invariably personal. And here the pluralistic and the absolutistic personal idealist part company. Both find that I know objects in some sense beyond myself. The pluralist asserts that I could not know these objects unless they were essentially like me, and that non-mental and impersonal objects would be unknown.[1] The absolutist, on the other hand, argues that knowledge implies identity of knower and known; that I know the Absolute by being identically a part of Him; and that I know other selves in so far as they, like me, are genuinely though partially identical with Him.[2] Both pluralist and absolutist, however, argue that knowledge is inexplicable unless its objects are personal.

Herewith, the second division of this paper reaches the end toward which it has hastened. It has indicated, very summarily, the outlines of the argument at the base of the conception of the universe as completely personal. No resentful hearer or reader can realize more keenly than I the indecent brevity and consequent inadequacy of this statement of the grounds of a personal-

[1] *Cf.* J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Lecture I, pp. 10 ff., and *passim;* C. A. Richardson, "Scientific Method in Philosophy and the Foundations of Pluralism," this REVIEW, 1918, XXVII, pp. 233 ff., 267 ff.

[2] *Cf.* J. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, Lecture IV ff.; B. Varisco, *The Great Problems*, pp. 16 ff., 292 ff.; M. W. Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 410 ff. There is need for a fuller statement of the absolutist view and a more critical discussion of its difficulties.

istic cosmology. The main concern of this paper is, however, with the consequences of the doctrine if true, not with the arguments to prove it true. I propose, therefore, boldly to ask you, whether or not you are satisfied with the metaphysical grounds for the conception, to assume, if you do not believe, that the universe is personal and not confined to the limits of a single self. The way is then open for the discussion of the nature of the personalist's world.

III.

The third division of this paper is devoted to the working out, in rough fashion, of certain details of an unsolipsistic but personalistic nature philosophy, a conception of the universe as constituted by an indefinitely great number of interrelated selves. The phrase 'great number of selves' is used without prejudice to the possibility, which preceding pages have suggested, that the many selves may turn out to be members of an all-including Absolute Self. It matters little to students of nature philosophy whether or not this absolutist doctrine is correct. For the Absolute of modern philosophy is a respecter of persons. Therefore even if the many selves are parts of the One Self they will retain both their personality and their relation with each other through the Absolute.

Fundamental to such a sketch of personalistic cosmology is a delimitation of the term self. The self, in the first place, is not the entelechist's soul: that is to say, the self need not be conceived as having inherently a decisive influence on phenomena; it has not by definition the power to intrude itself, as ultimate cause, among phenomena.[1] Self, in the second place, is not to be confused with soul, in Locke's sense of the term: that is to say, the self is no underlying substratum, no unknown substance, no "something I know not what to support ideas,"[2] but is a directly experienced reality. To turn from negative to positive: By

[1] This unqualified denial of the propriety of *defining* the self as an essentially potent being, a controlling influence, is not of course a dogmatic denial of the possibility of later proving the self possessed of such a power. This is in truth a question to be determined by argument. What is denied is the right to define the immediately observed, known self as a power.

[2] *Essay*, Bk. II, Chapter 23, 15.

self is meant a being essentially similar to that which any man means when he says 'I' or is conscious of 'myself.' The self is, strictly speaking, indefinable since there exists nothing else of its class from which to distinguish it. The self is, none the less, a complex being[1] possessed of at least the following characters: relative persistence, or identity, which need not mean immortality; change, or growth; uniqueness, that is, irreplaceableness, or individuality; and relatedness to its environment.[2] These characters of self, according to the fully personalistic conception, are directly experienced and not inferred. And it cannot be stated too unequivocally that the personalist in asserting that the world of organic and inorganic nature is, in concrete reality, a world of selves must use the word self with the psychological meaning gained through introspection, that he must mean by self a being essentially similar, in its nature, to himself. Otherwise cosmological personalism becomes logomachy, mere metaphorical play on words.

The conception of the world of nature as a world of genuine selves does not, however, preclude the possibility or probability that these selves differ vastly from the human selves and from each other. One empirical consideration, later to be discussed in more detail, points directly to such differences. We believe ourselves to communicate directly with other human selves—to put questions to them, to be hailed by them and to share their experience. Such communication with inorganic nature, with plants, and with many classes of animals is either lacking or, at the least, is uncertain and unsystematized. The world of nature is accordingly in great part, to use Royce's phrase, an uncommunicative world.

[1] The position: "Either consciousness is a complex entity, not fundamental but definable in terms of simpler entities . . . or else consciousness is fundamental and simple," seems to be based on an illicit conversion of the proposition: "The elemental is indefinable." This is, of course, true, but it certainly does not follow that "the indefinable is elemental." (*Cf.* E. B. Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 73[2].)

[2] On the conception of self, *cf.* M. W. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, Chap. I and Appendix, Sec. I. (For bibliography *cf.* pp. 282 f.) "The Self in Scientific Psychology," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1915, XXVI, pp. 495 ff.; *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, fourth edition, pp. 407 ff.

From this preliminary statement of the basal principles of personalistic cosmology we must turn to detail and to argument. The personalist has first to show the psychological likelihood that beings exist, far less complex than we and yet significantly described as selves. That the higher vertebrate animals are conscious beings is commonly admitted. The question is whether we are to think of earthworms and beetles, of bacteria and amœbæ, of pebbles and lichens as selves. Leibniz was first among modern philosophers in the attempt to establish the possibility of the extra-human self by emphasizing in our human experience, the wide difference (1) between inattentive and inactive and attentive, active consciousness; (2) between simple and complex; (3) between sensuous and non-sensuous consciousness. It is essential to our purpose to study these conceptions and to begin by making them vivid to ourselves. Let each of my hearers, therefore, using Leibniz's own method, contrast himself in the alert, interested, competent handling of an intellectual problem with himself in the first moments of waking from a very sound sleep, utterly dazed and unaware of where he is or what he has to do, as little recognizing a past as anticipating the future. In this sleepy state he is an inattentive, sluggish, undiscriminating, inactive self; in the other case he attends, distinguishes, compares, relates, advances, controls. Between the two experiences are innumerable grades of attentiveness, weak and strong, dispersed and narrow; innumerable variations in the importance and complexity of non-sensuous, thought-factors of experience; innumerable gradations between utter passivity and complete self-initiative. The personalist appeals to this incontrovertible experience of widely different levels of our own consciousness as confirmation of the possibility of selves of many grades or types. There well may be, he insists, selves who are even more inactively and inattentively conscious than we are in the sleepiest stage which we can catch by retrospection, selves who remain at this inactive level from which we have risen, though to be sure we periodically fall back into it. These would be the relatively stable selves, which constitute what we call the inorganic world, which we conceive as unconscious mainly

because there seems no hope of getting them to talk to us. And corresponding to the successively more attentive, active, discriminating levels of our own consciousness would be other types of selves—until one reached the higher vertebrates whom, implicitly or explicitly, people already treat as selves even if they do not so conceive them.

Up to this point, in our attempt, following Leibniz's clue, to attain a conception of non-human nature-selves, on the analogy of our own widely varying types of experience, we have scarcely touched upon the temporal distinction, emphasized both by Leibniz and Ward and by Royce, which may mark off one group of selves from another. In its genuinely sleepy state every self is unaware of past and future; so far as its own present consciousness goes, it is like Melchisedec "without father, without mother, having neither beginning of days nor end of life." It furnishes, therefore, the basis in human experience for Leibniz's simple self (his naked monad), *mens momentanea seu carens recordatione*,[1] the momentary, unremembering, unrecognizing self. At the lower extreme from us, according to this view, are, or may be, momentary selves, selves whose consciousness of change does not rise to the contrast of past with present and future. They are thus selves of a moment, unremembering selves. And between them and us would be, as already suggested, an ascending scale of selves roughly rated by their capacity to recall and recognize the past and to anticipate the future. Royce's characteristic contribution to the conception of selves as temporally distinguished is well known and may best be stated in his own words. It is that of the varying time-spans. He supposes, in common with all personalists, that "when [we] deal with Nature [we] deal with a vast realm of finite consciousness of which [our] own is at once a part and an example." He next points out that "our consciousness, for its special characters, is dependent upon a fact which we might call our particular Time-Span. If we are to be inwardly conscious of anything, there must occur some change "—not too fast nor too slow—" in the contents of our feel-

[1] *Theoriæ motus abstracti Definitiones.* Gerhardt edition, IV, p. 230. *Cf.* Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 255 ff.

ings. What happens within what we describe as the . . . thousandth of a second necessarily escapes us. On the other hand, what lasts longer than a very few moments no longer can form part of one conscious moment to us. But suppose that our consciousness had to a thousand millionth of a second or to a million years of time the same relation that it now has to the . . . length in seconds of a typical present moment. Then, in the one case, we might say: 'What a slow affair this dynamite explosion is.' In the other case, events, such as the wearing of the Niagara Gorge, would be to us what a single musical phrase now is, namely something instantaneously present. . . . This simple consideration," Royce at once applies, suggesting, for example, that " a material region of the inorganic world would be to us the phenomenal sign of the presence of at least one fellow-creature who took, perhaps, a billion years to complete a moment of his consciousness, so that where we saw, in the signs given us of his presence, only monotonous permanence of fact, he, in his inner life, faced momentarily significant change."[1]

The special use which Royce makes of this hypothesis, in the discussion of evolution, does not here concern us. We have simply to emphasize the fact that actual experience of the varying time-span justifies the hypothesis of still greater variation and thus the conception of selves with time spans so widened or so narrowed that we may even fail to know their existence. This speculative conception enlarges that gained by direct observation of our own inattentive, inactive, unthoughtful moments—the conception of the relatively simple, sensuous, stable, unremembering self.

The immediately preceding pages have mainly tried to show that the conception of non-human selves makes no assumptions which are not verifiable on some level of human consciousness. In other words, emphasis has fallen on the essential likeness of the human to the non-human self. In the pages which follow, the stress will fall upon the different groups of non-human selves and on the methods of distinguishing them from each other. When the superhuman self, whether God or Absolute, is disre-

[1] *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 227–228.

garded, it is found, as already suggested, that the non-human selves are most readily grouped, according as they are from our human standpoint (1) intercommunicating, or (2) communicating, or (3) uncommunicating selves—in other words, according as they either signal to us and are signalled back to, or as they signal to us without being aware of us or of our message, or, finally, as they are totally uncommunicative. It will be profitable to dwell for a moment on these distinctions and, in particular, to stress the difference between intercourse, or intercommunication and mere communication.[1] Evidently, when any self (A) is in intercourse with another (B), A must be aware (conscious) of B and of B as conscious in his turn of A. Furthermore, since by self is meant *inter alia* a changing being, that is, a being of successive experiencings, this mutual awareness carries with it an awareness by A of B's changing experiences and by B of A's changes. Complete or adequate intercourse, finally, must imply a correspondence between these successive changes in A and B. Mere *communication* of A with B may be said to occur whenever A modifies B's experiences, but full *intercommunication*, or intercourse, implies the mutual relation and the awareness of it.

From this statement of the principle of classification, we turn back to the problem of grouping the non-human selves. To begin with: everybody will agree to describe the higher vertebrates as intercommunicating selves. In this case we have strong empirical (if not metaphysical) evidence of their intercourse with each other and with ourselves. Nor is there any conclusive reason for limiting the group of intercommunicating selves to the vertebrates, to the exclusion of the higher anthropoids, for example. At the other extreme are the non-human selves which make up what we call the inorganic world. We become aware of their presence through such of our sensational experiences as we do not refer to the communicative selves, men or animals. Suppose, for example, that I have at one and the same time, a great complex of sense-experience—visual, auditory, kinæsthetic—not attributed to my own initiative. Part of this

[1] Royce seems not explicitly to recognize what I have called communication. By 'communicative' he probably means 'intercommunicative.'

experience I designate as awareness of voices, gestures, and faces; and this part I regard not merely as indication of the existence and presence of other selves but as disclosing to me their changing experience. Another part, however, of my sensational experience, the perceptual awareness, for example, of hardness and grayness or of blueness and rippliness, I describe as consciousness of pebble or of lake. But in this case I am conscious of no give-and-take of experience between pebble or lake-self and me; I find no mutually varying series of changing ideas which enables me to designate or to 'feel' just this complex of sensation, as sign of a communicating self. I cannot, in other words, regard either one of these sensation complexes as indications of a single, individual pebble-self or lake-self with the assurance with which, when I am conscious of a gesturing, talking human body, I regard it as a sign of another self. It is true that, on the strength of my personalistic philosophy, I believe that my pebble consciousness indicates the presence of personal being. I have, however, no way of knowing that the pebble is, like my own body, the 'phenomenal sign' of a *single* non-human self. It may, rather, indicate merely one part or aspect of a non-human self, or again, it may indicate a whole group of such selves. In other words, the pebble may correspond not to a human body, as experienced whole, but to one organ or fragment of a body or else to a group of bodies.

We have next to consider the status of the vast numbers of living beings, lower in the scale than the intercommunicating non-human selves, yet widely different, it seems, from the stolid inorganic world.[1] We have, apparently, no intercourse with them, yet the more we know about them the more we incline to conceive them as conscious beings. For experiments on animal behavior show that animals of every class may learn by trial and error, in other words, may adapt their reactions to their environment. Not merely insects and crustacea but infusoria—the stentor of Jennings's classical experiments,—have learned both to vary response with changing environment and even to

[1] Merely in the interest of brevity, the following paragraph omits any reference to the possible plant-selves.

alter their reactions to a fixed environment.[1] Now this acquired capacity to vary reactions to a fixed environment is the most significant indication of consciousness. By most biologists the stentor which alters its response to a harmful stimulus and the crab which learns to shorten its progress through a labyrinth are judged to be conscious animals, that is, selves. And we may go even further. Not only is an adaptively reacting animal probably conscious; it is also in a very literal sense communicating with the observer, informing him, by its forward or backward movements, let us say, of its changing experience. On the other hand, nothing suggests that the observer makes the animal aware of his own onlooking experience. The animal is, in other words, a communicating, but not an intercommunicating self; it gives but does not take. Thus experimental observation justifies the recognition of a group of communicating, non-human selves midway between the totally incommunicative and the obviously intercommunicative nature-selves.

One difficult topic suggested in the preceding pages must at least be touched on.[2] The distinction of the uncommunicative from the communicative selves has more than once involved a reference to the human body. These casual references have now to be amplified, and the relation between self and body to be stated in personalistic terms. (It should be emphasized at the outset that the personalist does not share at all in the spiritualistic dualist's concern to show the independence of some aspect of self—memory or emotion or will—from the body.[3]) For, to the personalist, brain and body are themselves mental, and "the experience of the body is the body."[4] Looked at *en bloc* and uncritically my body may be described as follows: It is a peculiarly ubiquitous object—in the querulous words which the little

[1] "Studies on Reactions to Stimuli in Unicellular Animals," *American Journal of Physiology*, 1902, VIII, pp. 23 ff. *Cf. Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, 1906, Chapter X, expecially pp. 175 f.

[2] The paragraphs which follow, to the end of this section, have been added to the paper as read.

[3] It is curious to find Bergson, of all men, playing into the hands of these dualistic spiritualists by the teaching that memory cannot be cerebrally localized. *Cf. Matter and Memory*, Chap. II.

[4] D. H. Parker, *The Self and Nature*, p. 86[1].

girl applied to God, it is always "tagging me around"; and it has two important aspects: (1) In the first place, it is not only, like all physical things, a public object, open to other people's observation as well as to my own, but it is a mediating, instrumental sort of object, serving to indicate my existence to other people—in Royce's words, serving as 'phenomenal sign' of me.[1] (2) My body, in the second place, according to the uncritical observer, is not merely a visible and audible and tangible object, perceived by other people along with me. Rather, it is also a source of unshared organic sensation, the awareness, for example, of stabbing pain, of palpitation, or of bodily vigor. This description of the body in terms of the every-day observer has now to be philosophically interpreted. In the terms of the impersonal idealist, plainly, my body is a persistent complex of sensations, visual and auditory and contact sensations, on the one hand, kinæsthetic and visceral sensations, on the other. The personalist goes further. He points out, first, that sensation is somebody's sensing and that accordingly 'complex of sensations' means somebody's complex sense-experiencing. In the second place, he reaffirms the plain man's distinction of public from private object, that is, he describes my visible, tangible, and audible body as complex experience shared by me with the other selves who are said to see, hear, and touch me. Finally, and once more in agreement with everyday observation, the personalist describes my body as that part of other people's shared sense experience which suggests to them the existence, the presence, of *me*, a self with individuality of its own. (And conversely, the part of my sense experience which I call "consciousness of other human bodies" suggests to me the presence of other selves.)[2] My body as directly experienced is, therefore, according to the

[1] It should be noted that these are only relative distinctions of the body from other physical objects. There are other persistent ways of experiencing—the consciousness of clothes and of home, for example. And there are other instrumental ideas, mediating experiences. The experience, for example, indicated by the words "using a microscope" is essential to my having that other experience designated as "seeing the capillaries of a frog's circulatory system."

[2] For the sake of brevity, no reference is made to the consciousness of my body as phenomenal sign of me which, in addition to my direct introspective awareness of myself, I possess.

personalist, a complex and chiefly sensuous experiencing—in part, my incommunicable experience and in part the shared experiencing of many selves which serves as the 'sign' of my presence.

But this description of the human body is still incomplete. It has left out of account those portions of my body which are not, and need never be, objects or parts of any one's direct experience. For in addition to (1) my body as seen, touched and heard, and in addition also to (2) my body as 'felt' by me alone, in a toothache, for example, there remains (3) my body as inferred object—my body, as containing spleen and liver and cerebral ganglia, for instance. I infer the existence of some of these organs when I have watched the cook drawing a chicken and of still others when I have studied the diagrams in a physiology book or have dissected a cat.[1] By the surgeon when he operates, or by the histologist, still other organs—the adrenal glands or the white blood corpuscles—may be directly observed. Yet neither adrenal glands, nor blood corpuscles, nor brain, nor liver can be described (in the way in which my *directly experienced* body is described) as my peculiarly constant sense-experiencing, in part private but in part shared, and *serving as sign of me.* The reason, once more, why my body-as-inferred is not to be described as sign of me is clearly this: neither I, nor other people when conscious of me, are inevitably or invariably or even often aware of my caudate nucleus, blood corpuscles, adrenal glands, or even of my liver and my lungs. And yet, according to careful observation and experiment, I, the conscious self, with my experience, am closely related to this merely inferred portion of my body. In particular, that part of my experience which constitutes my directly-perceived body is closely bound, in one organic system, with the inferred portions of the body. For example, my muscular reactions (directly observed), vary with changes in the frontal Rolandic region (inferred) and my bodily vigor in anger or in rage (observed) vary with the secretions of the adrenal glands (inferred).

[1] "Few of us realize the limitations of our direct 'private' knowledge of the interior of our bodies. Probably the most important item of it is that knowledge of something beating under our tangible and partly visible ribs."

How then shall the personalist conceive these inferred portions of my body? Only two ways seem to be open to him. Either he must content himself with describing them in merely ideistic, not personalistic, terms, as inferences (and in part percepts) of the scientist, forming part of an ordered description of the world of actual and possible sense impressions,[1] or (basing his speculation on the personalistic conception of body or bodily organ as sign of self) he must follow Leibniz and Ward in supposing that such parts of my body as are not signs of me must be signs of some other self or selves. To such selves I should stand in relation of 'dominant' to subordinated self or selves.[2] Such selves, other than I, would have direct experience of what for me are my inferred bodily organs. I should stand to them in no adequate relation of intercommunication. For though, truly enough, they might be said to affect me, for example in my unlocalized fatigue, and though I might be said to affect them when I took chloroform or strychnine, we should yet have no mutual awareness each of the other's awareness of him.[3] It is this lack of complete intercourse which would debar me from knowing the number or the exact nature of such subordinate selves.

With this parenthetical and speculative consideration of the obscure self-body relation this rough outline study of the personalistic nature philosophy must end. To sum up its main points: It has taken the term self at its introspective face value, yet has distinguished three main groups or grades of non-human self: first, the intercommunicative selves, represented by the higher vertebrates; second, a group even less distinctly limited, of selves imperfectly and one-sidedly communicative; finally, the group of selves which constitute the reality of inorganic nature, selves whom we cannot disentangle from each other or delimit, selves with whom we are apparently related but of whom we are not directly aware, with whom we have not intercourse.

[1] *Cf.* Pearson, *op. cit.*, chapter on "The Scientific Law."

[2] To avoid awkwardness of phraseology, I use the plural 'selves' in the remainder of this paragraph but without intending to decide dogmatically between the two hypotheses.

[3] The relation of this speculation to the various subliminal-self hypotheses must be passed over, since it would carry us too far afield.

IV

The final section of this paper attempts to state and to meet the most common of the serious criticisms urged against personalistic cosmology. Purely emotional prejudices must be disregarded since it is obviously futile to combat criticisms after the order of

> "I do not like you, Dr. Fell;
> The reason why I cannot tell."

Irrationality apart, people ordinarily ignore or discard personalism, as nature philosophy, because they confuse it with what it is not. And of such misinterpretations there are at least three:

1. First and foremost, personalism is confused with prescientific animism and our philosophers are consequently desperately eager not to 'compromise themselves' with it. But the truth is that present-day personalism differs almost as much from the ancient fashion of personifying laurel trees and rivers as it differs from the modern realist's apotheosis of mathematical and logical quantities. The modern personalist, as we have seen, turns his back on tree-selves and pebble-selves; emphasizes the differences between selves of different levels; and frankly disclaims the right to a definite conception of any selves with whom he has no communication.

2. More serious is the confusion of personalism with impersonal idealism or the identification of personalism with the solipsistic form of personalism. Such theories reduce to mere series of ideas—whether or not referred to a self makes, at this point, little difference—solar universe after solar universe and geologic epoch after geologic epoch. Against this doctrine the instinctive repulsions of scientists and nature lovers are arrayed. And though this largely affective rejection of ideism and solipsistic nature philosophy cannot be accepted as a metaphysical refutation, though the achievements of Mach and Pearson and the other phenomenalists constitute proof positive that scientific progress is compatible with the adoption of this view—none the less it must be admitted that this reduction of the nature world to the compass of a single mind, to the status of succeeding ideas is, to speak very temperately, a barren and repelling doctrine.

And, whether true or false, attractive or repelling, the conception of the world of nature as a series of phenomena simply is not identical with personalism, the conception of nature as a society of concretely real persons. Personalism can not fairly be rejected for characters which it does not have.

3. More important than either of these misinterpretations is the confusion of personalism with the conception of the universe as lawless. Personalism is condemned for its alleged break with the conception of natural law. To conceive the physical world as fundamentally made up of conscious beings, or selves, is held to menace the doctrine of uniformity, the assumption of predictability on which experimental science is based. The advance of science, it is pointed out, is bound up with the possibility of experiment; and experiment presupposes the recurrence of phenomena; and the recurrence of phenomena involves a uniform and necessary causal relation between them. Such a necessary uniformity, we are told, is what is meant by a law of nature; and scientific progress, it is justly held, has consisted and must consist in the establishment of laws of nature, verified hypotheses. The personalistic conception of nature, it is urged, substitutes for this conception of an orderly world of predictable phenomena, causally connected, what is virtually the picture of the nature-world as a mob, a crowd of irresponsible, capricious, lawless conscious beings.

The personalist meets this formidable arraignment by protesting that it is founded on an inadequate view of personalism, and on a misconception of scientific law. To start from the first of these positions: it is of capital importance to point out that personalism is not of necessity an indeterministic doctrine. It has been so described largely because it has been confused with entelechistic vitalism which conceives the soul as possessed of genuine initiative. But the self, notwithstanding the characters which it shares with the soul, differs from the soul both in origin and in nature. Thus the soul is inferred as explanation of biological phenomena, whereas the self is directly experienced. And the inferred soul, or entelechy, is conceived as "suspending physical reactions now in one direction and now in another,"

whereas the activity attributed to self is a species of consciousness, a feeling of activity. Such a feeling of power or activity is not always a consciousness of capacity for choice—it may consist, for example, in the mere expansive feeling of spontaneity, untrammeledness. And even when it does take the form of feeling of power, such a feeling may perfectly well be illusory. In other words, the active self may be a really determined self for all its feeling of power. It is true that most of our modern pluralistic personalisms—Bergson's, for example,—are indeterministic, but this is not because a self is of necessity an undetermined being. Leibniz's essentially deterministic personalism is a standing refutation of the uncritical identification of pluralistic personalism with indeterminism. And absolutist personalism offers what is perhaps the only *a priori* confirmation of determinism.

Even more important to the present purpose than the truth that not all personalism is deterministic is the consideration that personalism even of the indeterministic type does not stand irreconcilably opposed to the conception of scientific law. Scientific law is of course to be taken not in the old, traditional and mythical sense of an inexorable sort of external force, an inexplicable coercing power, but in its truly and admittedly scientific sense, as formulation of the results of "humanity's process of making a survey of the universe"—formulations which, as Jennings points out, reduce to predictions such as these: "When you have such and such experiences you will have such and such other experiences."[1] In a word, a scientific law is an experienced, generalized, justifiably predicted uniformity of experience. Now this conception (obviously stateable, and in fact most often stated, in personal terms) clashes with indeterministic personalism only when the uniformity is regarded as absolute, when the predicted recurrence is conceived as apodictically certain. But the temperate, experimental scientist makes no such claim. He simply postulates absolute uniformity for the purposes of experiment and description. When the union of NaCl and

[1] "Doctrines Held as Vitalism," *The American Naturalist*, 1913, XLVII, pp. 392–393.

H_2SO_4 fails to give hydrochloric acid and sodium sulphate the experimenter does not, to be sure, view this as a proof of indeterminism but rather as indication that his salt or his sulphuric acid or both are impure. But this practical postulate of complete uniformity is far from constituting an assertion of axiomatically absolute nature uniformities, of necessary predictions. Here the clear thinker, scientist or metaphysician, must take his stand with Hume. Scientific laws are generalizations from experience: in the nature of the case, finite experience cannot be universal. No human being has ever seen or can ever see every particle of matter; attraction inversely as the square root of the distance is not the only conceivable relation between particles; even the law of gravitation is therefore a generalization from the widest observation, not an intuitive and axiomatic certainty, still less an inexorable compeller of the motion of particles.

But when once this is admitted, as it is indeed admitted by most scientists, all incompatibility vanishes between experimental science with its postulate of uniformity and even indeterministic personal cosmology. For the nature world as the indeterministic personalist conceives it is no anarchic universe in which one event is as likely to occur as another, in which prediction is futile. Rather, the world of the indeterministic personalist is itself a world of laws; but these are statistical laws, laws of average behavior, uniformities of the conduct not of individuals but of classes. From their wide observation of the ages at which men die, the insurance companies—in spite of the great diversities of physical constitution—make up their tables of vital statistics, predictions of the dates of death of their clientèle. From their incomparably wider acquaintance with particles, utterly simple beings, physicists formulate the law of gravitation —still a statistical law, but an indefinitely greater, indeed a practically complete approximation toward an absolute uniformity. To quote from James Ward's illustration of the same point: Supposing that industrial statisticians "instead of trade returns from a score or two of countries had returns from one or two thousand, the inhabitants being increased a myriad fold,

and being also severally vastly more the creatures of habit than men now are, we can imagine such statistics would approximate still more closely to those of the physicist. The physicist, like the statist," Ward insists, "is always dealing with aggregates, but unlike the statist he finds the constituent individuals to be beyond his ken. The statist is aware that individual variations underlie his aggregates but they do not interest him: the physicist is ignorant of those underlying his and assumes that they do not exist."[1] Thus, for the indeterminist, in Royce's phrase, the statistical not the mechanical (in the sense of the inevitable or absolute) is the canonical form of scientific law.[2] But this conception of the nature-law as statement of average behavior, especially when applied as in physical science to the behavior of relatively static individuals, amply justifies the experimentalist in his scientific postulate of complete uniformity.

A final criticism must be met. Granting all that has been said—granting that personalism is unjustly identified with preanimism, with phenomenalism and with the doctrine of the lawless universe, it remains to the end, the critic insists, a conception totally unfitted to interpret the detailed results of scientific observation and experiment. The personalist, it is with some show of reason alleged, is shut up to the unfruitful statement: "there exist non-human selves", but has no clue to the number or the limit of them; and knows far too little about their nature to translate into personal terms facts of chemical combination, for example, of radioactivity, or of electrical insulation.

The personalist, in the face of this objection will admit, in the first place, that nature philosophy, is a more speculative doctrine than social philosophy, and, in the second place, that the physical world has often to be described in terms not of selves, but of spaces and motions and weight, not to name colors and sounds.[3] To take random examples: the description of Arcturus as shining

[1] *The Realm of Ends*, Lecture III., pp. 65–66.

[2] "The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical," *Science*, N. S., XXXIX, 1914, pp. 551 ff., *passim*.

[3] All manufactured things, clothes and houses, and automobiles have to be described in these terms.

like two hundred suns, of the sun as containing sodium, iron and copper in the form of gleaming vapors—these scientific descriptions certainly are not and cannot be in terms of the sun's or of Arcturus's conscious experience. The personalist, to be sure, will supplement this admission by pointing out that these descriptions of Arcturus's brilliancy and of the sun's gases are descriptions of the world as it appears, or as it might appear, to observing scientists. In other words: even when or if we find it impossible to describe physical phenomena in an adequately personalistic fashion, that is, in terms of individual conscious beings each with its own unique experiencing and initiative, we are yet driven to describe these phenomena in terms of the shared experiencing of conscious, observing selves. To use Fite's phrase in our own setting: when we are no longer able to know things as they feel, we none the less know them as they look—to us human selves.[1]

The personalist, however, is not content to stop here. He finds in scientific accounts of the physical world, not merely recorded observations, refined and multiplied by modern technique, of things as they look to people, and not merely laws stateable in terms of the uniform and predicted sequences of experience, direct or inferred. He finds also an irrepressible tendency to talk about corpuscles, atoms, ions as possessed of an individuality, a unique being, and, in particular, an activity and initiative of their own. "The atom," for example, is said to start with a certain "amount of kinetic energy";[2] radium is said to "emit energy"; bodies are held to "exert force"; "lines of force" are supposed to "repel each other."[3] These conceptions, the personalist boldly asserts, are of value, have a meaning, only as bodies and substances, thus dynamically conceived, and are virtually, though vaguely, regarded as active, initiating selves.

Confirmation of this conclusion is derived from the statements of scientists and methodologists of science. Ostwald, for example, bids us study our own "voluntary activity" (*Willens-*

[1] Warner Fite: "The Human Soul and the Scientific Prepossession," *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1918, Vol. XXII, p. 778.

[2] J. J. Thomson, *Electricity and Matter*, 1907, pp. 156 f.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 7 ff. *Cf.* W. F. Cooley, *The Principles of Science*, p. 129².

betätigung) in order to "gain an idea of the content of the concept of energy;"[1] Montague observes that "potential energy is . . . perceivable internally or by participation in it through . . . the muscular sense";[2] and W. F. Cooley says: "The fact seems to be that for most investigators, as well as for men in general, the straining of which we are conscious in our own organisms when in action is accounted sufficient ground for the posit of an active something within us . . . which is transferred to similar situations external to us and used as the natural cue for their interpretation. . . . That factor we call force, energy, power, at times will . . . : It is, evidently, an object of immediate experience."[3] It will be remembered that this is Pearson's contention. And, phenomenalist that he is, he would banish from science the conception of force excepting in the sense of "conceptual measure of motion," precisely because he believes that force, in any other sense, "is the will of the old spiritualist separated from consciousness."[4] But Pearson and Mach avail no more than Berkeley to hold down the scientist to the purely phenomenalistic categories.

Even the supposedly static characters of physical things are conceived in terms which, to say the least, are as truly personal as impersonal. Thus inertia ("the one sole unalterable property of matter")[5] is either defined in terms of passivity or inaction, as the property in virtue of which "matter cannot of itself change its own state,"[6] or it is conceived as "resistance to any change of state." But passivity is a basal character of the perceiving self, and resistance is, once more, a form of activity. In a word, the physicist when he talks in explanatory and not in descriptive terms, really personifies his units. For change and persistence, passivity and activity would be meaningless terms if they did not suggest to each of us his own self-identity and growth, his receptivity and self-initiative. I am not arguing, of course,

[1] *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, pp. 153 ff.
[2] *Essays in Honor of William James*, p. 123.
[3] Cooley, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–111.
[4] *The Grammar of Science*, second edition, pp. 305, 119.
[5] R. K. Duncan: *The New Knowledge*, p. 179, quoted by Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[6] Ganot, transl. E. Atkinson, *Physics*, 13th ed., p. 10.

that these conceptual entities of the scientists, the atoms and ions and electrons which they infer to account for observed phenomena, are really existing selves. I am claiming only that they are beings constructed after the analogy of selves—constructs which are meaningless unless conceived in personal terms. And if this is true, if at the very core of speculative science lies the concept of the conscious self, then assuredly personalism is no negligible factor of a genuine nature-philosophy.

In conclusion, therefore, I venture to appeal, in behalf of personalistic cosmology, for the respectful and detailed consideration which it has seldom received. Two tendencies of modern science, as this paper tries to show, seem to favor such an upgrowth of personalistic doctrine. The first of these is the prevalence, suggested in the pages immediately preceding, of dynamic theories in physics. The second is the rising opposition, evident in all the papers of this year's discussion,[1] to vitalism in the biologist's sense of the term. Biological vitalism, as mere emphasis on the categories of order and fitness, has been rejected on the ground that the biologist has no monopoly on these categories. Biological vitalism, as a capriciously indeterministic entelechy doctrine, has been condemned as a baseless hypothesis. But the elimination of biological vitalism opens the way, as the first division of this paper seeks to show, to psychological vitalism or personalism. I look hopefully, therefore, for a recognition of the claims of personalism as soon as scientists and metaphysicians can be persuaded that it involves neither animism, phenomenalism nor crass indeterminism.

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[1] *Cf.* this REVIEW, November, 1918, *passim.*

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLERIDGE'S THOUGHT.

LESLIE STEPHEN has expressed surprise, felt probably by nearly all readers of Coleridge, at the disproportion between the amount of his "definite services to philosophy and the effect which he certainly produced upon some of the ablest of his contemporaries."[1] That a man who wrote no systematic treatise, whose thought was contained in such unpromising philosophic forms as a history of his literary life and opinions, a volume of religious aphorisms, a popular literary magazine obviously foredoomed to unpopularity and death, some lay sermons, and endless conversations, should have been one of the two most stimulating English thinkers[2] in the early nineteenth century, "the anchor of the intellect of England" in that unsettled period, is indeed striking.[3]

Not so striking and yet, perhaps, not altogether a matter of course, is the fact that so little has been done, especially from the side of philosophy, to define the exact nature of his contribution. The best detailed study is that of F. J. A. Hort in his *Cambridge Essays*, 1856, but this was before much of the necessary material was available. Mill's *Essay* is appreciative but not detailed. Benn's account in his *History of Rationalism* is very detailed but completely unappreciative. Seth's notice in his *English Philosophers*, is, in the main, just, but not adequate. Shawcross's *Introduction* to his Oxford Edition of the *Biographia Literaria* is beyond criticism, but it is concerned primarily with the esthetic theory. There would seem to be a place, therefore, for a more thorough examination of his thought than has yet been made from the point of view of philosophy.

Before such an examination can be made, however, there is need for a preliminary study of origins; for the problem of determining just what his contribution was, is, in the case of a thinker

[1] *English Util.*, II, p. 373.
[2] J. S. Mill, *Essays.*
[3] Goldwin Smith, *Rational Religion*, p. 77.

such as Coleridge, bound up with the problem of tracing the literary influences upon his life, since it is always in the form of comment or criticism upon his reading that his thought takes what little shape it had. Always reading, and never save for amusement, as he says of himself, his philosophizing, like his interminable conversations, consists in oracular and edifying monologue on texts furnished by the latest stimulating book. To understand his opinions at any given stage of his career, therefore, one must know the text upon which his discourse is based, for it is always as critic, though constructive critic, that his contribution is made.

But at the same time that one insists upon the primacy of Coleridge the critic, one must also recognize this fact of his constructiveness, for while it is true that his discourse is always unintelligible apart from his text, it is sometimes equally true that his text becomes unintelligible as interpreted in his discourse. The system in which for the time he has become absorbed is, for him, no mere objective fact to be analyzed or reproduced, but a vital document in which he may hope to find some new form for his own self-expression. It is never impersonal curiosity that draws him on, but always a hunger for an ever greater satisfaction of his spiritual needs. His attitude is therefore appreciative and assimilative to the extent that what he finds is too often what he seeks. Whatever in his author lends itself to his uses he thankfully takes, not always with scholarly care as to the question of historic truth. He never gives himself wholly to the objects of his admiration: he will walk with them as long as he can constrain them to walk with him, but when they refuse to take his path he casts them off. It is this desire to find himself in successive systems, that has made the interpretation of his meaning difficult, and has caused him to be labelled with the name of now this one and now that, of his philosophic friends; whereas in truth he remains himself and goes his own way in spite of the variety of his intellectual affiliations. To understand him, then, is not merely to trace the history of his reading, but to appreciate his principle of selection.

The label that has most frequently been attached to him is

that of German Transcendentalism, either in the form given it by Kant, or in that represented by Schelling. The title was given him in his own day against his vigorous protest: "All the elements, the differentials of my present opinions existed for me before I had seen a word of German metaphysics, later than Wolf or Leibnitz. But what will this avail? A High German transcendentalist I must be content to remain."[1] Leslie Stephen represents him as the exponent of the same tendency, and even F. J. A. Hort, in his careful study, in spite of his appreciation of other factors, asserts that "the cardinal distinction of Coleridge's philosophy was obviously derived from Kant."[2] So, too, Seth,[3] following Hort, seems to take back with one hand what he gives with the other, in that although he recognizes that "he was no mere purveyor of German philosophy to the English public," he yet opens his chapter on him with the statement that "the earliest, and in some ways the most influential, representative of German Transcendental Philosophy in England is the poet-philosopher, Coleridge."[4]

That in vigorously rejecting this classification, Coleridge meant to assert the originality of his thought, is only in part true, for, in spite of the carelessness which characterizes his utilization of other's words, and which has called out such not wholly undeserved criticism, his recognitions of indebtedness are many and generous, though indefinite.[5] He lacks the scholar's interest in sources, absorbing and utilizing whatever meets his needs, but making no effort to distinguish as his own even those points in which he really does differ from his originals. He feels, with justice, that his thoughts are not borrowings, but neither does he assume them to be unique. They are for him embodiments and developments of that sound tradition in philosophy known inexactly as the Platonic. From first to last, Coleridge was a

[1] *Letters*, p. 375.

[2] *Cambridge Essays*, p. 319.

[3] *English Philosophers*, p. 319.

[4] H. L. Stewart in the *Harvard Theological Review*, XI, pp. 1–31, in spite of his recognition of the difference between the usages of Kant and Coleridge in respect to the term understanding, insists upon the same derivation from Kant.

[5] *Cf.* for his feeling about this *Anima Poetæ*, p. 106, *Biog. Lit.*, I, pp. 105, 244, Oxford ed.

Platonist of the mystic type, for a few years intellectually entangled with associationalism, and later charmed with the technical vocabulary of German transcendentalism, but always at heart akin to those believers in the direct vision of truth who have claimed the name and authority of Plato. It is not as turning the stream of English philosophy out of its native channels that Coleridge habitually sees himself, in spite of his tributes to Kant, but as returning it to the bed in which it ran in the days of its greatness, the days of Hooker, of the "latitude men," and the Cambridge Platonists. For him, the eighteenth century, with its Locke, its Hume, its Hartley, was the aberration, to correct which and to bring men back to that deeper tradition in philosophy without which he felt Christian doctrine must fall, was the labor of his life. It was his success in reviving this older tradition, the enthusiasm with which he preached its basic principles, the keenness with which he adapted them to meet the needs of his time, that constituted his essential service. Intellectual England, hesitant after a century of naturalism and doubt, was roused to new hopes by his vigorous preaching of the right to believe and eagerly welcomed the new basis of faith in the reality of the spiritual world.

But when we try to follow the thread of Coleridge's thought to prove this thesis we find it far from easy to trace the intellectual development of a man who wrote nothing of philosophical significance until after forty. We have his poems, his correpondence, and his ubiquitous marginal notes, as well as his note books. We have also his own wandering account in the *Biographia Literaria*, published in 1817, when he was forty-five years of age, but none of these sources are of such a character as to afford clear evidence of the steps in his development and the motives leading to them. The *Biographia*, to which we naturally look as the main source, besides being unsystematic and episodic, is polemical, and its autobiographical parts evidently colored by the faculty whose nature it is its aim to define. Coleridge is careless of dates and names, and temperamentally incapable of objective reminiscence. In his letters to Thomas Poole he even misdates his own birth, and, though always ready to recognize

his spiritual ancestry, his philosophy shows itself in his rooted conviction that his fundamental ideas were not gathered from his reading, but were the expression of his own nature. "Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that any one born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian."[1] Coleridge was born a Platonist and the changes his thought underwent were for him insignificant in comparison with the native unity which underlay it. His inevitable tendency is to read the beginning in the light of the end.

Of that beginning we get his own view in his intentionally autobiographical letters to Thomas Poole, as well as in Charles Lamb's passing sketch of "the inspired charity boy." In his childhood he was solitary, emotional, dreamy, precocious, turned in upon himself—"a character" by the time he was eight. He was a voracious reader, especially of works of the imagination, through the influence of which, he writes, "my mind had been habituated *to the Vast*, and I never regarded *my senses* in any way as the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions, not by my sight, even at that age. . . . I know no other way of giving the mind a love of the Great and the Whole. Those who have been led to the same truths step by step, through the constant testimony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which I possess. They contemplate nothing but parts, and all parts are necessarily little. And the universe to them is but a mass of *little things*."[2]

This activity of the imagination (which he seems to feel uncharacteristic of childhood) was further exercised and developed during his school life at Christ's Hospital, where his philosophic bent was set by his reading of the Neo-Platonists. How far he read and how much he understood, we do not know, but enough to make "the casual passer through the cloisters stand still, entranced with admiration (while he weighed the disproportion between the speech and the garb of the young Mirandula), to hear thee unfold in thy deep and sweet intonations

[1] *Literary Remains*, p. 37.
[2] *Letters*, p. 16.

the mysteries of Iamblichus or Plotinus."[1] And in his own words, "At a very premature age, even before my fifteenth year, I had bewildered myself in metaphysics and in theological controversy. Nothing else pleased me. History and particular facts lost all interest in my mind. . . . Poetry itself, yea, novels and romances, became insipid to me."[2] In particular, he had translated by that time, the eight hymns of Synesius from Greek into English anacreontics.[3]

Of this metaphysical disease he was cured for the time through the poetry of William Lisle Bowles and his own love for Mary Evans. But though he speaks of it as a cure, it was rather a change of form assumed by the malady, for the same Platonic spirit is manifest throughout and contributed to his later thought. It is impossible to separate his philosophy from his poetry or specify the one as determining the other—they were born together.

> A matron now, of sober mien,
> Yet radiant still and with no earthly sheen,
> Whom as a fairy child my childhood woo'd
> Even in my dawn of youth—Philosophy;
> Tho' then, unconscious of herself, pardie,
> She bore no other name than Poesy.[4]

And the spirit of both and of his whole view of life is given in this adaptation of Plato's figure of the cave,

> All that meets the bodily sense I deem
> Symbolic, one mighty alphabet
> To infant minds; and we in this low world
> Placed with our backs to bright reality,
> That we might learn with young untroubled ken
> The substance from the shadow.[5]

At the same time, however, that he was giving this ideal interpretation to nature and finding satisfaction in the visions of the mystics, his quick intellect was finding equal pleasure in the sceptical criticism of Voltaire and perhaps of Helvetius, though his acquaintance with the latter may have belonged to a

[1] Lamb, *Christ's Hospital five and thirty years ago.*
[2] *Biog. Lit.*, I, p. 9.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 170.
[4] *Garden of Boccaccio.*
[5] *Destiny of Nations.*

later period. His scepticism seems not to have been much more than the pride of a precocious boy in the independence and keenness of his intellect. "I had too much vanity to be altogether a Christian, too much tenderness of nature to be utterly an infidel. Fond of the dazzle of wit, fond of subtlety of argument, I could not read without some degree of pleasure the levities of Voltaire or the reasonings of Helvetius."[1] But his own passional nature was such that he could never seriously rest in a negative position and his infidelity never went further than his head. It is questionable whether there was any time in his life when he could not be called a Christian, and, if we allow his own flexible usage of the term, even an evangelical Christian.

On his removal to Cambridge, this negative movement in his life reached its furthest limit. It there took the form of the associationalism of Hartley and the Unitarianism of Priestley, perhaps even of the materialism of the latter. Just what his philosophical position was during his university years and for several years after, we have no means of knowing. He tells us that he was an enthusiastic admirer of Hartley during this period, naming his oldest child after him in 1796, and in 1794 he writes to Southey, "I am a complete necessitarian, and understand the subject almost as well as Hartley himself, but I go farther than Hartley, and believe the corporeality of thought, namely, that it is motion."[2] Yet in 1796, he writes in denying the preëxistence of a soul separable and playing on the body, "not that I am a materialist, but because I am a Berkleyan."[3] Again, he distinguishes his religious Unitarianism from his philosophical Trinitarianism, asserting that "I was at that time (1795) and long after, though a Trinitarian (*i. e., ad normam Platonis*) in philosophy, yet a zealous Unitarian in religion"[4] in the sense of denying the divinity of Jesus and the orthodox doctrine of the atonement. The most probable interpretation of the situation is that in Hartley's doctrine Coleridge found a philosophy which gave more rational satisfaction to his doubts

[1] *Letters*, p. 69. To his brother, 1794.
[2] *Letters*, p. 113.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
[4] *Biog. Lit.*, p. 114.

than did traditional theology. In particular, it was the Unitarian denial of the incarnation and vicarious atonement that appealed to his moral sense, for at that time he could see no rational meaning in the merely historic elements of the Christian creed. It was Hartley the Unitarian, rather than Hartley the Associationalist, who obtained his allegiance, his acceptance of the latter doctrine being probably only for a short time in the first flush of his enthusiasm. Indeed, it may well be that it never possessed his whole mind, but that for these few years it was held by him tentatively along with his temperamental Platonism, he himself insisting that it was this fundamental difference in his metaphysical notions from those of the Unitarians that led to his final re-conversion to orthodox Christianity.[1] Whether this retrospective view of his opinions at that time is to be accepted in the face of the assertions contained in his letters, is a question, but it may well be that these latter were only the expressions of the changing moods of the moment, though the doctrine of necessity certainly was held and taught for years. It is then, perhaps, safe to conclude that Coleridge's enthusiasm for Hartley's *Essay on Man* did not imply the rejection of Platonism, but the acceptance primarily of the Hartleyan rationalizing and critical theology, including the doctrine of necessity. It was as a practical system of Christian theology that he accepted it, rather than as a system of metaphysics; though it is impossible to deny that he may have held it tentatively as psychology and theory of knowledge for a while. So, in the 17th century, the Cambridge Platonists had felt that an atomistic natural philosophy was not merely consistent with, but even a support for a Platonic metaphysics.

Just what the steps were by which Coleridge passed beyond the influence of Hartley, we cannot be quite sure. We know that even as early as 1796 he felt the mechanical philosophy to be inadequate as a complete account of experience.[2] In the *Biographia Literaria*[3] he speaks of a period of doubt and investigation of the foundations of religion and morals about the year 1797,

[1] *Biog. Lit.*, p. 137.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, p. xxx, note.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, p. 132.

as the outcome of which he came to realize "that religion, as both the corner-stone and the key-stone of morality, must have a moral origin; so far at least, that the evidence of its doctrines could not, like the truths of abstract science, be wholly independent of the will. It were therefore to be expected, that its *fundamental* truth would be such as MIGHT be denied; though only by the fool, and even by the fool from the madness of the heart alone."[1] It dawned on him even before he had met the *Critique of Pure Reason* that, "If the mere intellect could make no certain discovery of a holy and intelligent first cause, it might yet supply a demonstration, that no legitimate argument could be drawn from the intellect *against* its truth."[2] Thus while not yet able to dismiss the mechanical philosophy based on the abstract understanding he was able to set a limit to its explanations and reserve a sphere in which its principles were not valid.

The underlying influence to which this gradual casting off of the mechanical philosophy was due was undoubtedly that of the mystics. As he puts it, "the writings of these mystics acted in no slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned within the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed to keep alive the *heart* in the *head;* gave me an indistinct, yet stirring and working presentiment, that all the products of the mere *reflective* faculty partook of Death."[3] In this passage he pays a specially glowing tribute to Boehme, and elsewhere in the *Biographia Literaria* he acknowledges his debt to the "Teutonic theosophist," the similarity of whose ideas to those of himself and Schelling he freely admits. But to Lady Beaumont he writes in 1810, "For myself, I never brought away from his works anything I did not bring to them."[4] Both statements may well be true, for Boehme's influence upon him consisted essentially, as he says, in keeping alive his heart in his head, and confirming him in his spiritual faith until he was able to work out a system relatively expressive of it. It was the Neo-Platonic element in Boehme that appealed to him and made his mysticism

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, p. 98.
[4] *Memorials of Coleorton*, January, 1810.

the transition stage in the development to Coleridge's later and more personal philosophy. Southey implies that Boehme was coming into the ascendant about 1804, but Shawcross places the study of him and his fellows during the years 1795–1798, a much better confirmed date.[1]

To this time also belongs in all probability at least the beginning of his familiarity with the great seventeenth century divines to whose Christian interpretation of Plato and Plotinus, or perhaps better, to whose Platonic interpretation of Christianity, Coleridge undoubtedly owes the fundamentals of this later thought. Coleridge the theologian is only a reincarnation of John Smith and Henry More. This indebtedness he acknowledges again and again, so that it is amazing that any one acquainted with the writings of these men should persist in looking for any other source for the most persistent and distinctive of his doctrines. The passage in the *Biographia* just quoted in which he insists upon the place of the will in religious knowledge, might have been taken from John Smith or Benjamin Whichcote, and his distinction of the reason from the understanding was almost a commonplace of the school, not formulated with the definiteness of his later thought, but the same in essence as inherited from their common master Plotinus. His more thorough study of these divines belongs to his later years and finds expression in his *Aids to Devotion*, which is only a free commentary and criticism upon passages from their writings, but as early as 1802 he writes, "I have read a great deal of German: but I do dearly, dearly, dearly love my own countrymen of old times, and those of my contemporaries who write in their spirit."[2] That these beloved countrymen were not Bacon, Hobbes, or Locke, needs no proof. That their doctrine was not a pure Platonism, but a Plotinism, he recognizes with regret, Henry More at least being infected by "a corrupt, mystical, theurgical, pseudo-Platonism,"[3] from which only a "transcendental, æsthetic, logic, and noetic,"[4] such as was worked out by Kant could have

[1] *Biog. Lit.*, I, p. 242.
[2] *Letters*, p. 373, July 13, 1802.
[3] *Lit. Remains*, p. 114.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 267.

saved him. A suggestion which summarizes his own development—Platonism illuminated by Kant. This Kantian influence is the next in his life.

His life in Germany, from September, 1798, to July, 1799, though devoted almost wholly to the study of the language and literature, could not but have brought him into contact with the philosophy of the day and carried him still further back to a completely idealistic position. Yet we have no explicit evidence of this and are forced to date his real acquaintance with Kant about the year 1801. In March of that year he writes to Poole, "If I do not greatly delude myself, I have not only completely extricated the notions of time and space, but have overthrown the doctrine of association, as taught by Hartley, and with it all the irreligious metaphysics of modern infidels—especially the doctrine of necessity."[1] This sounds very much as if he were already familiar with the *Critique*, yet Leslie Stephen tells us that in some letters to Josiah Wedgwood, written only a few weeks before, containing an elaborate comparison of Locke and Descartes, "He writes as though he had as yet read no German philosophy. I know that he began a serious study of Kant at Keswick; but I fancied that he had brought back some knowledge of Kant from Germany. This letter proves the contrary. There is certainly none of the transcendentalism of the Schelling kind. One point is, that he still sticks to Hartley and to the Association doctrine, which he afterwards denounced so frequently."[2] Apparently, as Shawcross observes, the overthrow of the association doctrine must have been accomplished in the interval between these two letters and, Leslie Stephen to the contrary notwithstanding, possibly by the help of some knowledge of Kant.

With this year 1801, Coleridge enters upon the study of the writings which were to help him to the final expression of his thought, so far as one may speak of anything final in connection with it. "Once for all, read Kant, Fichte, etc., and then you will trace, or if you are on the hunt, track me,"[3] he wrote in 1804.

[1] *Letters* (edit. by E. H. Coleridge, 1895), p. 348.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 351, note, containing extract from letter by Leslie Stephen.
[3] *Anima Poetæ*, p. 106.

By the time we reach 1810 and the publication of the *Friend*, the trail leads us also through Schelling, Bruno, Spinoza, and Jacobi.[1] In 1808, Southey gives the succession of Coleridge's idols as Hartley, Berkeley, Spinoza, Plato, Boehme, the latter being in the ascendant in 1804. This is hard to reconcile with what we know of his development unless we are to take it as part of the list which concludes with Kant and Schelling or as referring to personalities rather than doctrines. Kant's influence may date from after 1804 and probably Schelling's greatest attraction was considerably later, about the time of the publication of the *Biographia Literaria* in 1817. He was acquainted with Spinoza at least as early as 1803 and his mysticism and doctrine of immanence had the same attraction for him that the earlier mystics had. It may be that the study of Bruno, whom he read in 1801, was the link between these latter and the *Ethica*, which in turn led on to Schelling through Kant. Certain it is that Spinoza was the object of his profound admiration, though with qualifications, as late as 1812, as is testified by that dramatic scene reported by Crabb Robinson, when Coleridge kissed the portrait of Spinoza on the title page of his works, declaring, "'This book is a gospel to me.' But in less than a minute he added: 'His philosophy is nevertheless false.'"[2]

To Jacobi he expresses no direct indebtedness, but he was familiar with his writings and, in the second edition of the *Friend*, 1818, he accepts Jacobi's conception of reason as probably identical with his own, *i. e.*, that it is an organ of spiritual vision corresponding to the eye in the world of nature.[3]

To what extent Coleridge was influenced by these various sources can only be estimated in connection with the statement of his own doctrine, but there is no real ground to doubt the truth of his assertion already quoted, "All the elements, the differentials . . . of my present opinions existed for me before I had seen a word of German metaphysics, later than Wolf or Leibnitz."

When one turns from the consideration of the philosophical

[1] *Life*, p. 165, note.
[2] *Diary*, October 3, 1812.
[3] "First Landing Place," Essay V.

influences upon his life and looks for the underlying motives which led Coleridge from stage to stage of his development, one finds a baffling scarcity of material from which to reconstruct his inner life. He was a good letter writer, but his biographers and editors seem to have conspired to publish only those letters which they deemed readable and to leave to oblivion those of merely philosophical or religious interest. In consequence, there is no spiritual portrait of the man Coleridge and it is almost impossible to unify and give life to the facts we have.

The special problem is that of the continuity between the early radical and the later evangelical; or, to take it from another angle, it is that of the relation between the philosopher and the religionist. In early manhood, Coleridge was a political radical and a rationalistic Unitarian and determinist; in later life he was a conservative and a Trinitarian of almost pietistic fervor. Intellectually, he was through and through a speculative thinker, preaching, in season and out, the necessity of adding to one's faith knowledge: religiously he was the champion of revealed religion and the orthodox creeds. So marked were the apparent contradictions of his position that both then and now he has been accused of at least pious accommodation to the prejudices of his age and a lack of intellectual honesty.[1] Whether or not his position was free from contradictions is at least a debatable question, but that he himself was sincere there can be no reasonable doubt. He was, at the worst, sentimental and self-deceived, but there is not the slightest evidence that his whole soul was not just as much in his orthodoxy as in his radicalism.

In the analysis of his temper, the fundamental element to be recognized as the basis of all his later thought is that which he later labored so hard to define under the name of the imagination. Whether we agree with his distinctions or not, it is this tendency to see in sense only the symbol of spirit, to pass beyond the appearances of nature to its reality, to construct out of the data furnished by the senses a meaning intelligible only to the spirit, in short, it is this essentially poetic spirit that is the determining factor in Coleridge's life. Even though his properly poetic

[1] *Cf.* Benn, *Hist. of Rationalism.*

period was but of a few years duration, yet in the critic, the philosopher and the theologian we find reappearing and dominating, the poet. As poet, his thought moves along the *via media* between sensationalism and intellectualism, rejecting the brute facts of the one and refusing to rest content with the lifeless abstractions of the other, insisting always on the primacy of the spiritual vision. In later life he refuses to admit the imagination, in any technical sense, as the organ of the highest truth, but it is none the less the dominance in him of this interpretive faculty that determines him in the acceptance of the intuitive reason as the source of our knowledge of the spiritual world.

Endowed with this temper in childhood we can see how easily Neo-Platonism could make its appeal. Not that we can give much significance to his early fascination with the doctrine, for it probably served mainly as food for his imagination, rather than as meat for his intellect. What his early religious experience was, or whether he had one at all, we do not know. Probably his earliest real experience was the Unitarianism and radicalism of his college days, deepened by the sense of the injustice suffered by his teacher and by the deprivations involved in his own dissent from the authoritative doctrine. This decade of his life might seem unrelated to his poetic temper, in spite of the fact that it was the period which included all his significant poetry, were it not that the ground of his objections to orthodoxy were not intellectual, but moral. Metaphysically, he remained a Trinitarian, but he could not accept the morality implied in the doctrine of original sin and atonement: they seemed to him inconsistent with a spiritual interpretation of life. And so he was forced over to a system which seemed, superficially at least, more in conformity with the moral reason, emphasizing as it did, in spite of its doctrine of necessity, the independence and rights of the individual.

His return from Unitarianism, which seems to have been taking place about the time when he was making the acquaintance of Kant, was due, it seems likely, not so much to the direct influence of that philosopher, as to a change and deepening of his own experience. We have no record of any specific religious

experience during those years, or any years. Some have seen in his disappointment over the loss of Mary Evans and the subsequent heart-searching sceptical crisis a short time afterwards, the source of his later change of views, but these were several years before his faith in Unitarianism was shaken, nor was the love affair serious enough, nor the scepticism religious enough, to account for the return. As he puts it, "A more thorough revolution in my philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into my own heart, were yet wanting."[1] The more thorough revolution in his philosophic principles was due to the help of Kant, but it was a condition, rather than a cause, of the change. It consisted essentially, in all likelihood, in the distinction drawn between the theoretical and the practical spheres, enabling Coleridge to see that difficulties in the intelligibility and theoretical formulation of a doctrine need not prevent the acceptance of its truth, provided it has a basis in the practical reason, or in spiritual experience, as Coleridge would prefer to put it. This at once made possible the acceptance of the difficult doctrines of Christianity, provided only that their reality be given in experience. And here comes in his "deeper insight" into his own heart, an insight gained, there can be small doubt, through the bitter experiences of his own weakness and misery, for it was during these same years of his studies in German philosophy that he reached the lowest depths of his slavery to opium. It was this realization of his own sin, yet helplessness, that made impossible for him the optimistic moralism of Unitarianism and forced him back upon the evangelical doctrines of sin and atonement.[2] These experiences he could not explain, but they were for him vital facts, whose ultimateness was only confirmed by the inability of the understanding to comprehend them. The orthodox formulation of them remained unacceptable to him but, as he puts it, he was able to "vault over the unhappy idol"[3] and take his stand on the fact it had displaced. In his later years he seems to have worked out a more explicit philosophy of these

[1] *Biog. Lit.*, I, p. 137.
[2] *The Friend*, III, 312; *Hort.*, p. 338.
[3] *Lit. Remains*, p. 195.

facts, but even as late as the *Aids to Reflection* they remain essentially mysteries, given, but not explicable even in symbols.

Of the reality of this evangelical religious experience and its influence upon his thought it is impossible to doubt, pervading as it does not only his published theological works, but also his correspondence. And yet as one reads and compares with the facts of his life, one is tempted at times to question, not the sincerity, but the truth of the experience. Is there not an element of the sentimental in his confessions? Are we not reminded of Rousseau and the tendency to offer the feelings for the deed? This, perhaps, is inherent in all evangelical religion, but it becomes more prominent the greater are the possible deeds for which we are asked to accept the feelings. In Coleridge's case, his religion was deep enough to enable him to sympathize with the established religion and to form a basis for an honestly held philosophy, but not deep enough to regenerate his will and build up his character. He remained to the end a disorganized genius, enthusiastic for virtue but at the mercy of his impulses and feelings: enjoying his Christian experience, but incapable of turning it into action. And not merely is there this lack of self-control, but also a, perhaps unconscious, sense of justification through confession, a making a merit of self-abasement. His biographers have rightly noted that he never laid claim to exemption from criticism on the score of his genius, but they seem not to have felt this subtler soothing of his conscience through the waiving of any such claim.

But in addition to this emotional satisfaction, his Christianity also gave him just the intellectual and imaginative satisfaction his mind needed. With true insight he writes even as early as 1798: "But though all my doubts are done away, though Christianity is my passion, it is too much my *intellectual* passion, and therefore will do me but little good in the hour of temptation and calamity."[1] And a growing intellectual passion it remained throughout life, in spite of the deeper emotional tone induced by his later experience. To interpret Christian doctrine in the light of that experience became his life work, in which his poetic,

[1] *Letters*, p. 247.

imaginative power found free scope. Literal facts had small interest for him in comparison with their symbolic meaning, and the Bible, nature and history became but so much material for the constructive power of his imagination. He seemed to revel in this emotionally satisfying process of interpretation and no facts came to seem incapable of yielding some spiritual meaning. Not that he meant to ignore facts, but a mind that could find in Isaiah the revelation of the philosophy of the French Revolution and could "challenge all the critical benches of infidelity to point out any one important truth, any one efficient, practical direction or warning, which did not preëxist, and for the most part in a sounder, more intelligible, and more comprehensive form, in the Bible,"[1] must have had the interpretative faculty developed at the expense of the receptive. The only facts for which he had an interested and critical sense were those of the inner life and in this field his analysis is illuminating. Religion as personal experience was the foundation of all his thinking and supplied him with the key to his metaphysics, but in the application of that key his imagination often runs wild until we are apt to feel as we follow him that the religious structure he has reared, or rather, sketched, has for him the personal value of imaginative play rather than the objective value of a religious interpretation of the world. As not rooted in the will, his attitude tends to be esthetic rather than religious, and his later work to be, even more than in the case of most speculative philosophers, that of a metaphysical poet rather than that of a critical theologian. Both in temper and training, therefore, he belongs, not to the German transcendental schools of his day, but to the traditional English Platonism of the seventeenth century.

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[1] *Statesman's Manual*, p. 315, Bohn Ed.

MIND, BODY, THEISM AND IMMORTALITY.

MATERIALISM, in the general sense of the origin of life and mind from a material system, is not more incompatible with Theism than is the principle of evolution. In any case Theism must conform its belief in the divine origin of the human personality to the arrival of that personality by stages. First the humblest organisms, then animals a little less humble, then animals higher in the scale, and so on through an indefinite succession till life finally ascends to man. To infer an extra and prior stage behind the humblest organism from which organic evolution started makes no appreciable extra difficulty for theistic interpretation. One sovereign added to a million makes no appreciable difference to the trouble of counting. If the creative process required so many steps between man and his first living ancestor, it could easily include a purely material ancestry for the latter. Materialism, in the simple sense that matter was the prius of mind, only adds an appendix to the scheme presented to Theism for explanation.

It is important to realize that the material origin of life and mind adds nothing appreciable to Theism's difficulties; for inspection of the cosmic span of the earth's history, so far as this inspection is possible, indicates that matter gave birth to life and, through life, to mind. The evidence points to a previous earth that could not carry living creatures. It was, to mention one point, a furnace for their destruction. Since life appeared where there was formerly only inorganic matter the evidence again indicates that, when the earth became a practicable habitat for plants and animals, the living issued from the non-living.

Professor Pringle-Pattison's assertion, in his *The Idea of God in Modern Philosophy*, that the evolution of the living from the non-living is a point of no philosophical importance, is true in so far as it implies that this materialistic appendix to the doctrine of evolution need give no extra trouble to the Theist. If God developed man from an amœba he could presumably produce

the amœba from lifeless matter: if he did the one he might equally well do the other. It does seem over-emphatic to deny any philosophical importance whatever to the generation of the living from the non-living—so momentous an occurrence must have some significance. The details of divine method must bear on our interpretation of it. Professor Pringle Pattison's over-emphasis helps, however, to direct attention to the importance of avoiding certain conclusions often associated with the belief in the evolution of the living from the non-living. Materialism is usually associated with beliefs that are antitheistic because it tends to a mechanical conception of life. Materialism in the simple sense of the priority in time of matter to life and the genesis of the later from the earlier is no more incompatible with Theism than organic evolution. It can be so further construed as to make it incompatible. This is not peculiar to materialism, for Theism can be ruled out of a scheme of thought that puts mind before matter. Materialism has become a bogey term because it has usually connected itself with mechanical conceptions of life and mind. It has, for example, not merely inferred that life and mind originally proceeded from matter but has insisted that whenever they are found in action they are being constantly produced from it. We must accept the evidence to hand that life and mind originally issued from matter. It is not complete, it is true. Our knowledge and power of interpretation are both very limited, but we must go by what we have, as a man must live on his income though it be small or inadequate. Mind undoubtedly appears to have proceeded from matter, but our estimate of it must not be based upon this particular fact. Both sides of the transaction must be examined. Materialism has become a bogey word through the assumption that descent decides destiny. This is akin to the aristocratic tendency to connect a lofty genealogy with the man who becomes great. It is quite possible that we should increase our respect for matter instead of roundly declaring it to be no fit parent for mind.

The living organism and the lifeless thing appear different to the mind, as blue and red are different experiences for it. Mechanism and vitalism disagree over the significance of the difference.

As blueness and redness are two variations on a single theme of color sensation, so for the mechanist there is nothing more in the difference between the living and the non-living than a variation between two sets of purely physico-chemical processes. The vitalist believes in a difference of kind between the purely physico-chemical nature of the lifeless and the inclusion in the organism of an extra-mechanical agency. Organism = physics + chemistry = matter + energy = inorganic matter. This is the mechanist formula. The vitalist requires two formulæ: non-living = physics + chemistry, and organism = physics + chemistry + X. The vitalist is backed by immediate experience or the impression made on common sense, for the living organism seems to differ from the physico-chemical, from the purely inorganic, and to differ essentially by its *tactical* methods. Very humble animals appear to strive persistently after an end. A small amœba dodges and twists when a larger amœba pursues it. A beetle will run when prodded once and sham dead if prodded twice. Pursuit and escape, with considerable tactical accompaniment, form a considerable part of the routine of life. It has been remarked that intelligence is highly developed in animals that, like the fox, are both hunters and hunted. Tactics, suggestive of plastic and modifiable concurrence of activities on results, seem to distinguish the living from the mechanical and fixed of the non-living.

It is doubtful where animal tactics become conscious and mental, but consciousness does finally appear. Plant life, animal tactics, animal consciousness, the human mind: this series irresistibly suggests that the evolution of life involves a new activity within the cosmic process. This is the X in the vitalist formula. It ultimately declares itself most completely in mind, when it reaches its terminal development in man. In its earlier stages it can only be more vaguely described as 'life.' This conception that an extra-mechanical agency or factor or entity, more vaguely describable in its earlier phases as 'life,' more definitely recognized in the phase of animal consciousness, most completely known in its final development as the human mind, has arisen from, or out of, an original inorganic prius, seems to cover

most satisfactorily the data of experience. At some cosmic point 'life' conjoins with the material. Their first conjunction is the living thing or organism—consciousness is yet in the future. The evolution of plant and animal life proceeds from the conjunction and coöperation of the physico-chemical and 'life.' Organization proceeds along the double lines, connected and independent in their mutual coöperation, of material and vital. 'Life' becomes conscious and consciousness becomes the human mind.

According to this conception the body and the mind are two mutually interacting and interdependent entities. There is no need for the further supposition that they are *substances* in the metaphysical sense of the term. An individual mind is an entity, its associate body is also an entity—just as the driver and his engine are entities, though the actual relation between mind and body is more intimate and perplexing than the relation between the engine and its driver. The dependence of the mind on the body connects naturally with its ultimate origination from the material. The action of the body on the mind and of the mind on the body, although perplexing to conceive because of their apparent disparateness, appear intelligible in the light of this origination. The apparent disparateness may not be so great as is often supposed. Spatiality does not cut absolutely clean between the mental and the bodily. The spatial severance of material bodies involves as an essential element, coexistential separation. Minds are also coexistentially separate. The thoughts of two different minds may be contemporaneous and quite apart. Coexistential separation may be carried over into 'life' and mind as the permanent representative of the space of the material world, and maintain a connecting link between mind and body. Driesch uses the terms 'entelechy' and 'psychoid' in place of 'life' and 'conscious life'—the conceptions are similar in principle though not necessarily identical in detail.

He conceives the vital agent as non-spatial, as outside space but acting into it. The interaction between the spatial and the non-spatial is one of the standing puzzles of thought. It has

led to attempt after attempt to so conceive mind and body as to evade their recognition as separate, though not necessarily separated, entities. They are two aspects of the same thing; they correspond to two different mental attitudes; the body is a phenomenon that attends consciousness as a shadow attends the opaque body. These and other conceptions endeavor to evade the conclusion, defended in recent thought by McDougall, that body and mind are two separate entities. Space seems to cut the mind, regarded as an entity, so completely off from the body. If the space of the material world includes the two elements of extension and coexistential separation, the mind, by retaining the latter though rejecting the former, maintains its connection with the matter from which it originated.

This connection originating in the generation of mind from body, is maintained as the basis of a copartnery. This notion of a copartnery between two interacting entities seems to provide a convenient method of conceiving the relations between body and mind. The two partners depend upon one another: the body provides sense-organs for conveying impressions received by the mind as sensations; the mind interprets and decides, it guides movements through the motor apparatus supplied in the physiological mechanism. This is probably the primary office of the mind—to realize situations for the body and conduct it to food or safety. Consciousness was probably in the first instance little more than a useful appendix to the body. Possibly it began as little more than a feeling of pain or of satisfaction to whip the organism into activity or encourage it to persist in useful efforts, such as eating. Through our own action under fear or anger or love we may perhaps catch a glimpse of the first stirrings of life into consciousness—stirrings that may be compared to an emotional drive on the living being. As mind developed from its first conscious beginnings it acquired more the status of a junior partner—dealing with situations that affected itself, but in which the body had a predominant interest. This junior partnership continued well on into the human era. "The human mind," writes Professor Whitehead, "was not evolved in the bygone ages for the sake of reasoning, but merely to enable

mankind with more art to hunt between meals for fresh food supplies."

But the mind has not remained tied in servitude to bodily demands, any more than in originating from the material it merely repeated the chemical and physical characteristics of its parentage. The difficulty in accepting the cosmic evidence that life and mind proceeded from matter resides mainly in the apparently startling break with the *cosmic heredity*. Something has sprung from matter and energy that they seem incompetent to produce. It is difficult to persuade ourselves that we are no final judges of cosmic competency and accept the evidence that life proceeded like a new creation from the broad bosom of the material world. Hylozoistic theories attempt to evade this conclusion. Mendelism suggests a possible explanation of the apparent origination from matter of life and mind. Matter may contain the vital principle repressed within it as the recessive hereditary quality is repressed by the dominant. As a succession of births may sort out the recessive Mendelian factor and permit expression to it, so during the material process the vital principle may be liberated to pursue its own course, not independently of matter but developing according to its own nature. This resolution of the production of life from matter into escape from enclosure within it, may or may not make the term 'materialism' a misnomer. Neither materialism nor hylozoism can give a final decision adverse to Theism. In any case, life and mind sprang out of matter, remained connected with it, continue to depend upon it (matter in its turn depending on them) but develop in accordance with their own principles and nature. In developed man mind becomes the senior member of the copartnery. Social intercourse, love and a whole range of emotions, beauty, truth, morality, religion become the dominating interests. Matter is now seen clearly in the position of a mother bearing a child of genius who will far surpass her in achievement.

This brief outline seems to sketch in the general relation between mind and body that most satisfactorily expresses the data of experience. The whole evolution of life is a progression from inferior grades of existence to superior. This progression appears

as an impulse originating in the creative process by which life sprang from the lifeless. The living organism, typified still in the plant, was the first result of the coöperation between the two agencies that now divide the cosmic process between them. Life, breaking by its creative nature with the causal routine of the material, moved upwards into consciousness and from animal consciousness into the human mind. It derived benefit from the physico-chemical agencies from which it sprang and with which it remained connected. Doubtless the marvellous organization of the human body was based fundamentally on constant physical and chemical factors but assisted by the creative and organizing capacity of life and consciousness. Ultimately the human mind became the supreme entity, though still coöperating with the body and remaining dependent on it, though also independent. Such a sketch simply attempts to conceive the nature of the evolutionary process presented to Theism for explanation. It does not decide against its power to give that explanation.

It is natural that mind and body should share some methods of procedure. There are various characteristic methods readily perceptible in the organism. Hydrolysis is one such method. The chemical processes in all living matter consist very largely of hydrolytic decompositions. In hydrolysis chemical molecules are divided into others by the entrance of a molecule of water. Two new molecules are formed by the fission of an old one and the addition to the divided parts of atoms from the entering molecule of water. The body converts starch into sugar by a series of hydrolytic decompositions. Hydrolysis occurs so frequently in the chemical processes of the body that it can be reasonably regarded as a standard chemical procedure adopted by the organism. Hydrolytic processes are familiar to the chemist, and they can be frequently induced or facilitated by small quantities of some substance that often remains unchanged at the end of the hydrolytic decomposition. Such substances are known as catalysts and the whole process as catalysis. The organism provides special catalysts for many of its hydrolyses in the form of complex organic compounds known as enzymes.

Enzyme action, often closely associated with hydrolysis, is another characteristic method of procedure in the organism. Hydrolysis and enzyme action are characteristic of the living thing in its physico-chemical aspect. There is another method of procedure in which both material and psychical more obviously participate.

When men prepare machinery that can be touched off into appropriate action, as when a bell is rung by pulling a switch, they use a method that is almost the very soul of the procedure of the organism. The type of process in which an action already prepared in a mechanism set to a stimulus—like a gun set to fire by a touch on the trigger—is touched off by some cause slight in comparison with the total action, exhibits a standard psycho-physical method. The body is full of reflex actions. A dog's hind leg scratches his flank if it be rubbed at the right place. Snuff in the nostril produces a sneeze, the eyes wink when a body moves near them. The nervous system is largely a series of touch-off systems in which a relatively slight stimulus applied to a nerve or nerves may move a limb through the associated mechanism of bone and muscle, or cause movement of the whole body. In many reflex or virtually automatic actions, such as the playing of a pianist who is concentrating his attention on a conversation remote from his music, the psychical mingles with the mechanical. It seems clear that some bodily automatisms are set to a psychical stimulus. The pain of a pin-prick makes us jump. The wink of the eye seems to be due, in part at any rate, to the *perception* that something is approaching. If it be true that a sleep-walker does not wink when a candle is waved before his open eyes, it seems confirmed that a psychical stimulus initiates this particular reflex. Mechanical and apparently determined response is not necessarily indicative of the purely physico-chemical. Men endeavor to supply themselves with machines that will complete a whole series of processes in a perfectly automatic manner. This is a development of the practice of the organism. It is possible that when the sea-urchin points its spines to a passing shadow its reaction responds to a conscious impression. The shadow may be cast by an enemy and the sea-urchin may

have set a mechanism of defence to respond to a sign of possible danger. Instincts in their most absolute forms, as among the insects, are probably complex series of bodily mechanisms set to psychical stimuli. The hunting wasp who seizes the caterpillar, stings it at the exact spot and in the exact way to produce paralysis without death, places it in her nest and lays her eggs on it in the best position for the newly born grubs to attack their living host, can hardly be supposed to act through foresight, for she dies before her grubs are born, and has acted in a systematic, provident way without previous experience of their requirements or of the methods of paralyzing a caterpillar. Her performances can hardly be purely mechanical throughout—mechanical arrangements set to purely mechanical stimuli. Her movements will be different in detail in stinging each caterpillar that she stores for her young. Conscious appreciation of situations must be supposed to be present. Some conception of the operation of instinct can be formed by supposing that within her body certain physico-chemical mechanisms are 'set' to certain psychic stimuli. Her instinctive behavior is a series of actions resulting from such settings to the psychical stimuli constantly arising in the course of her acting. There is, there must be, some pliability in her conduct—she must adapt to the detail of contingencies. Part of this pliability may transcend explanation in terms of physico-chemical mechanisms set to psychical stimuli, part may be explicable in terms of alternative settings to possible stimuli. We can conceive an absolutely pure instinct in which a succession of purely physico-chemical or mechanical settings are touched off by successive psychical stimuli. Few, if any, instincts may be 'pure' in this absolute sense, but it seems clear that the psychical may coöperate with the physico-chemical by acting as stimulus to its mechanical setting.

The converse action also occurs in the interaction between the body and the mental. Within the mind ideas tend to associate into organized groups, comparable with the physico-chemical settings of the body. The laws of the Association of Ideas express the mental tendencies to organize such psychical settings. Odors are well known to form very fixed associations. The

smell of a particular flower, for example, may become almost permanently associated with some particular events. The smell at once rouses a definite set of memories and flashes past scenes upon the mind. The memories are 'set' to respond to the stimulus of the odor. Since the odor depends ultimately on physical or chemical action on the organs of smell, a bodily stimulus initiates a psychical reaction. In all perception there seems to be the response of a psychical 'setting' to physico-chemical stimuli. The memories of past experience are so organized that when impressions from the external object are received through the sensory apparatus the mind apprehends the object and realizes the meaning of the stimuli applied to it. The sensations received from an object stimulate a mass of memories and ideas so organized that the mind interprets them as a bird flying or as a mass of rock. Perception is marvellously plastic. This plasticity may partly transcend the conception of psychical settings to material stimuli, it may derive in part from a richness of alternative and compounded settings to very varied stimuli. The illusions of perception often reveal the existence of this 'mechanical' element within the psyche. A wanderer in the dark is filled with fear and his ideas become 'set' to flash the perception of a ghost upon his mind. A dimly seen white sheet touches off this setting into an illusory ghost.

This conception of interaction between mental and bodily in terms of stimulus-applied-to-setting may be compared with Descartes's notion that the pineal gland was the point of conjunction between mind and body. The difficulty of conceiving the interaction between such different entities was minimized by supposing it to occur only at one particularly appropriate point. The notion that the mental and the bodily act as stimuli to one another, in a similar way, minimizes the amount of interaction between them. Bergson speaks of the psychical reaction overflowing the cerebral state, connected with it as a coat is connected with the peg on which it hangs. If the cerebral motion, the terminal point of the physico-chemical stimulus, acts on the mind as the pull of a lever sets off an engine, the mental reaction does do much more than merely present a psychosis parallel

and correspondent to the neurosis. The conception of a perfect parallelism between brain processes and mind processes ultimately leads to the opinion that they cannot act upon one another. The recognition that one characteristic procedure of the psychophysical individual is the setting of a system to a stimulus provides an intelligible way of conceiving the interaction between mind and body.

This conception does not exhaust the nature of consciousness, but it suggests considerations that may bear on the destiny, the immortality, of the human psyche. The birth of mind from matter does not decide against a final theistic interpretation or make it less possible. Does the close connection between mind and body originating in this birth decide against man's immortality or make it less probable? The body certainly dies. If the connection is a permanent tie the mind seems doomed to die with it. The continual dependence of the mind on the body during physical life does not necessarily imply that it cannot continue to exist when there is no body to depend on. The child may depend very greatly on his parents during their life, he may continue to depend on their support when he is older, without being unable to live on when they are dead. He can continue to live because he is just as truly an independent existence as a dependent on them. This independency of nature grows with his years. As an infant he must be suckled or fed and cared for, as a man he *can* care for himself even though he continues to depend upon his parents. A similar growth of independency appears to occur in the mind. The effect of sensory stimuli depends more and more on the mind itself than on the material, and perhaps on the bodily agencies. The primrose by the river's brim is less than a primrose to the confused perception of the very young child, little more when he is older; it may be the suggestion of thoughts and speculations to the mature mind that can hardly be perceived to be related at all to the original perception of the flower. The mental contributions steadily and progressively overshadow the contributions conveyed through bodily stimuli. Imagination can dispense with information from the actual world more and more as the mind grows

and develops. It is not possible to attain certainty through science or philosophy regarding the ultimate or actual relation between body and mind. It may be that the mind is ever tied to its brain processes, however wide the sweep of its imagination and however relatively insignificant its actual physical impressions received from the external world may appear to be. But it is quite possible that it is not fixed firmly to the body as its indispensable base. There are suggestions in its ever-widening sweep that it can use the body as a base for achievements that can make it ultimately independent of it. There seems to be a steady shift of the center of dominance. The infant is the creature of its appetites, the conceptions of the mind grow, or grow in the normal development, into superiority and supremacy. The young child, like the humbler animals, no doubt regards the world as a place to feed and sleep in. For the mature mind the world of sense tends to disappear in a universe of beauty, truth and goodness. The mind required matter for its prius, it required the body for partnership in its process of development, but it is possible that when that partnership has played its part and been dissolved it may be free to follow its own life.

JOSHUA C. GREGORY.

BRADFORD, YORKSHIRE.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION; THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1918.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE eighteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., on December 27 and 28, 1918.

The business meeting was called to order at 11:50 o'clock on December 27 with President Mary Whiton Calkins in the chair. The published minutes of the last meeting were approved. The Treasurer's report for the year was read and referred to auditors Fite and Woods. The report follows:

H. A. OVERSTREET, TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Time Account.

Debit.

Time account, January 1, 1918	$323.02
Interest, January 28	4.84
	$327.86

Credit.

August 20, 1918, transferred to check account	$150.00
Balance on hand	177.68
	$327.86

Two Hundred Dollars Registered Bonds of the 4¼ % Third Liberty Loan, Nos. 513173, 513174 in the keeping of the Treasurer.

Check Account.

Debit.

Check account, January 1, 1918 (Spaulding, January 23)	$192.41
Received from time account—August 20, 1918	150.00
Received from dues	180.00
Interest on Liberty bonds	2.98
	$525.39

Credit.

January 23,	Spaulding expenditures (Letter, January 23)	$ 57.24
February,	clerical (letter, February 13)	2.83
February,	express package from Spaulding	3.99
March 22,	printing	14.00
March 26,	stamps and envelopes	9.12

April 11,	clerical	3.56
April 18,	printing	2.75
April 27,	stationery (large envelopes)	2.50
May 6,	stamps	9.00
May 13,	clerical	3.75
July 1,	W. T. Marvin	4.66
	L. J. Henderson	26.10
	W. C. Warren	5.00
	R. F. A. Hoernlé	9.50
	H. S. Jennings	35.78
July 20,	printing	29.83
August 16,	Third Liberty Loan Bonds	200.00
	interest on deferred payments	1.69
September 4,	exchange	.50
December 16,	expenses of acting secretary	14.07
		$435.97
Balance on hand		89.42
		$525.39

The report of the Executive Committee was read and accepted. The President took occasion in behalf of the Executive Committee to apologize for overlooking the provision requiring the Executive Committee to appoint to the discussion committee two members of the Association in addition to the leader; also for the President's misstatement of the title of the Acting Secretary upon the Secretary's resumption of his duties.

The following new members were elected on recommendation of the Executive Committee: Dr. Irwin Edman, Columbia University; Dr. Kenneth S. Guthrie, All Souls Church, New York; Dr. Stephen C. Pepper, Concord, Mass.; Dr. Abraham A. Roback, Harvard University; Dr. Adolph J. Schneeweiss, Columbia University; Dean William Marshall Warren, Boston University.

Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, H. B. Alexander; *Vice-President*, J. B. Pratt; *Secretary-Treasurer*, H. A. Overstreet; *Executive Committee Members*, E. C. Wilm, W. M. Urban.

The Executive Committee presented for the consideration of the Association three discussion topics chosen from among those submitted to the Committee by the members of the Association: Contrasted Theories of Beauty; The Nature of the Community; Contrasted Theories of Time. It was moved and carried to postpone the selection of the next year's topic until Saturday morning.

The Executive Committee asked the Association to express its wish concerning payment of the expenses to the December meeting of its

guests, Professors Warren and Jennings, participants in the discussion, stating that the Executive Committee stood ready to assume this expense. It was moved, seconded and carried, without dissenting vote, that the Association pay these expenses.

It was finally moved and carried that the report of the Executive Committee, with its recommendations, be adopted.

The report of the Executive Committee included the recommendation that the Constitution be amended so that Art. III, Sect. 1 shall read: "The officers of the Association shall be a President, Vice-President, and Secretary-Treasurer. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Association at each annual meeting. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be elected for a period of three years."

Professor Overstreet read the report of the Committee on Place of Meeting, which was adopted.

A motion to continue the Committee on International Coöperation was seconded and carried.

The report of the Committee on the Possibility of Securing More Representative and Inclusive Meetings of those Interested in Philosophy was read and accepted. The report follows:

Some further step in the direction of securing larger coöperation among those interested in philosophy seems desirable. The present situation with three organizations, none of them completely inclusive, seems to be largely due to accident.

Our first organization under the name of the American Psychological Association served an excellent purpose for a time, but increasing professional interests aided perhaps by the increasingly technical character of psychology led to a separate organization of the philosophers under our present name. At about the same time the Western Philosophical Association was organized. This also at the outset included both philosophy and psychology and for several years planned its programs and elected its officers on this dual basis. Without any formal action the Western Philosophical Association has, like the American Psychological Association, come to correspond to its name, and has practically dropped psychology. Finally the Southern Philosophical Association was organized. The result is that whereas the American Psychological Association, like similarly named associations in other fields, is a general all-inclusive association, there are three philosophical associations which overlap in part.

As pointed out in a report of a committee of this association two years ago, our association has never been exclusively eastern. It has western members; it has from time to time chosen officers from the west; it made a liberal grant last year to aid a journal published in a

western city. On the other hand, we recognize that the American Association at present does not fully perform the service rendered by similarly named associations in other fields.

1. It does not bring together so many as ought to come together. In its Atlantic Coast meetings relatively few are present from the West; in the one meeting thus far held in the West few attended from the East.

2. Meetings have not been arranged with a view to cover all parts of the country so as to distribute the expense of attending meetings somewhat equally over all sections. Meetings have perhaps been regulated more by offers of hospitality, by the convenience of a majority of members, and by the thought that western and southern members had their own associations.

The reasons for larger gatherings and for a more comprehensive organization of the profession are obvious. Aside from the advantages of acquaintance and of the added importance which occasion lends to the discussion of at least certain themes, there is growing recognition that in a republic a profession like ours has a duty not only to seek truth and to teach the young but also to contribute towards shaping institutions and public opinion. This is met in part by publication, but a comprehensive organization holding widely representative meetings would furnish additional opportunity and tend to call out the best thinking and most effective presentation.

The chief obstacle in the way of such meetings is no doubt the expense of travel, but men in other fields overcome this obstacle to a great degree. Philosophers ought not to be the only group unable to transcend space. The best device for meeting this difficulty seems to be not to attempt a maximum attendance every year but to plan for such a general meeting once in two or at most three years.

Any plan must presuppose a conviction that a general meeting is worth some effort and sacrifice. If the association will affirm the principle the subordinate matters of organization and method could be easily worked out. Three plans or types of plans are possible.

Plan 1.—Enlargement of the scope of the American Association. This Association might itself undertake the task. This would involve (1) enlarging its membership, *e. g.*, by including all now enrolled in other Associations and some not now enrolled in any; (2) arranging a schedule of meetings for some years in advance, to be held in the several sections of the country with the understanding that the biennial or triennial meetings should be of especial importance; (3) constructing a program for these special meetings which should give prominence in at least one session, to the public as contrasted with the more purely

technical aspects of philosophy; (4) making definite provision for publishing papers, carrying out more completely the policy of the last and of this present meeting.

Plan 2.—Stated joint meetings or congresses. The three Associations might provide by amendments to their by-laws for biennial or triennial joint meetings or congresses; the president for the first congress to be chosen by all members of the three associations through a mail nomination and ballot conducted by the secretaries of the three associations; the provisional secretary to be appointed by the president thus elected; the committee on program, time, and place of meeting to be constituted by the presidents and secretaries of the three associations; officers for subsequent meetings to be chosen as the first joint meeting might provide.

Plan 3.—Federation in a new organization. A carefully worked out plan for this is presented in the proposal of the Western Philosophical Association's Committee.

Probably either the second or the third plan would be freer from objection as neither of these would interfere with the present excellent work of the respective Associations. Your Committee agrees that some plan ought to be adopted. Owing to the necessity of conducting this work by correspondence it has not been able to hold such a conference for discussing the merits of the three plans as might have enabled it to reach an agreement upon details. It, therefore, recommends that the association express its preference for one of the three types of plans (not necessarily for any precise plan) and instruct a Committee to organize such a general meeting for 1919, or later.

Signed:

H. B. ALEXANDER,
M. W. CALKINS,
ALBERT LEFEVRE,
H. A. OVERSTREET,
J. H. TUFTS, *Chairman.*

Professor Alexander opened the discussion by reading a resolution of the Western Philosophical Association proposing the formation of a general federation of all philosophical societies in America. The name of the federation was to be "The American Philosophical Association." It was to have, besides the regular officers, a Council, consisting of these officers and the executive officers of the federated associations. The regular meetings were to be biennial; biennial dues to be five dollars, apportioned between the federal and the federated associations. The Proceedings were to be printed in the form of a volume.

It was moved and carried that the Association declare itself on the three plans proposed by Professor Tufts' committee.

Professor Fite moved that the Association declare itself in favor of Plan Two, to wit, the holding of a triennial joint meeting of the philosophical societies. Professor Hoernlé moved as an amendment that the discussion be postponed until the Saturday morning meeting. The motion was carried.

The meeting adjourned until Saturday at 11:30 a.m.

ADJOURNED MEETING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1918.

The Association proceeded to vote upon the topics presented by the Executive Committee and chose as topic for 1919: "The Nature of the Community."

The following amendment proposed at the 1918 meeting was carried, to wit, Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution to read as follows: "There shall be an Executive Committee of nine members, three of whom shall be the officers of the Association, and six of whom shall be members at large, two members elected each year, for a period of three years."

In pursuance of the above amendment and on recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following were elected members of the Executive Committee for the three years' term: W. G. Everett, A. W. Moore.

The auditors reported that the Treasurer's report had been found correct. The report was adopted.

Professor Woods offered the following resolution, which was adopted: "The American Philosophical Association expresses its appreciation of the effort made by the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* to promote a better knowledge of American philosophy in France and desires to perpetuate and deepen the intimacy between French and American philosophers and the closer coöperation between France and the United States."

Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee, Art. VII of the 1918 report of the Committee on Discussion was amended so that the date should read August 1, instead of July 15.

The consideration of Professor Fite's motion being resumed, Professor Drake moved as a substitute motion: "(1) That we instruct the committee of which Mr. Tufts is chairman that it is the wish of this Association to join with the Western and Southern Philosophical Associations in constituting an inclusive association, and thereupon to change the name of our existing Association, that the new inclusive

Association may bear the name 'American Philosophical Association.' (2) That we instruct said committee to confer with a committee of the Western Association upon the problems involved in creating the inclusive association, and upon the proposal that congresses of the inclusive association shall be held, reporting the results of this conference to this Association at its next annual meeting."

Professor Overstreet moved to amend by dropping out, in the first sentence, the words: "and thereupon to change the name of our existing Association, that the new inclusive Association may bear the name 'American Philosophical Association.'" The amendment was carried.

Part (2) of Professor Drake's motion was then put and carried. The substitute motion as amended was then carried.

The meeting adjourned until Saturday afternoon at 2:15.

H. A. OVERSTREET,
Secretary.

ADJOURNED MEETING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1918.

The adjourned meeting was called to order at 2:15 o'clock. The following resolution of Professor Kallen was read:

"*Resolved:* That it is the sense of the American Philosophical Association that the indispensable instrumentality of a just and lasting peace is a League of Free Nations democratically organized and administered and designed to serve the common interests, economic and political, of all nations. Be it further resolved that notice of this resolution be sent to the President and to the Senate of the United States."

Dr. Benjamin Rand moved that the resolution be laid on the table. Carried.

Professor Drake proposed the following amendment to the Constitution: Article I, Section 1 to read as follows: "The name of this organization shall be the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association."

Professor Talbot moved a hearty vote of thanks to the hosts of the Association. The motion was unanimously carried by a rising vote.

The meeting adjourned.

H. A. OVERSTREET,
Secretary.

The Status of Ethics. A. A. ROBACK.

The fundamental fault in the general conception of ethics is the undue emphasis laid on theory. It is scarcely recognized that ethics differs from logic and science in general in that its main signi-

ficance lies in the *carrying out* of certain principles rather than in their being set up. Hence arises the difficulty of finding a suitable clear name for ethics so as to include both the theoretical and the practical aspect. It is not a science, nor a discipline, nor an art nor merely a study. It is a *method of living* and as such it goes behind all science, since scientific endeavor constitutes only one section of life.

A method always presupposes a *problem*. The problem every rational person has before him may be stated thus: "*Given a society such as I live in, what shall be my course in life, so that I could improve the world, myself understood, since I form a part of the world.*" On the descriptive side, morality thus becomes the adjustment of a certain condition to a purpose that sees fit to effect a change. In other words, it is *the reaction of a personality* to his or her environment. To distinguish this reaction from the mere behavior of an organism, let us call it a *reformation*, accentuating thereby the volitional element. The attribute 'normative' does not attach here. It is not an adjustment of 'what is' to 'what ought to be,' but of 'what has been' to 'what is' in the intellectual and moral make-up of the reformer. The change is from the past to the present.

It is the purpose that fashions the personality; the wider the purpose in life, the greater the personality and the less scope for actual conflict with other purposes. The personality should be judged, not the particular act, except insomuch as it is a manifestation of the agent's personality.

The concept 'good' not being exclusively ethical, does not enter into our problem. Instead we shall speak of 'right' and 'wrong.' There is no absolute criterion of rightness. Instead we have (*a*) *circumstantial* rightness (according to the time, place, and situation of the agent) and (*b*) a *pragmatic* or progressive rightness of an act as viewed by posterity. What is circumstantially right may be progressively or pragmatically wrong, but what is circumstantially wrong must always remain wrong. Thus if a man does what he is convinced he ought not to do, the act is wrong, though many advantages might have been due to this wrong. These have come about through sheer accident and an accident does not make a wrong act right. G. E. Moore's view of absolute moral evaluation is utterly untenable because only an omniscient being can know all the consequences of a given act.

How are Moral Judgments on Groups and Associations Possible? A Neglected Chapter in Ethics. W. M. URBAN.

The object of this paper is to call attention to a group of moral judgments—on associations, social classes, peoples and states—

which, while most significant in practical morals, find no place in Ethics, because that science is individualistic in its presuppositions, defining the object of moral judgment as the act or character of an individual. At most, quasi-moral judgments on institutions are recognized, according as they are, or are not, instrumental to human ends.

Judgments of praise and blame on collective wills are, however, it is maintained, a genuine and fundamental part of the morals of common sense, the meaning of which, analysis shows, cannot be reduced to judgments on individuals or groups of individuals. The view that the conception of collective wills is either illusion, or practical fiction (like legal fictions) is opposed. The arguments for the illusory character of these judgments apply equally to judgments on individuals. Practical fictions are workable up to a point, but ultimately they break down, as no genuine moral judgment can rest on fiction. The validity and "practical reality" of collective wills is argued after the fashion of Kant in his *Rechtsphilosophie*.

It is only upon such a conception that a genuine ethics of states is possible, as is shown by the failure of all attempts to construct international morality on an individualistic basis.

How are such judgments possible? Perhaps they are not completely possible now, but may be made possible by developing adequate conceptions of the unity and personality of social wills. Burke said he did not know how to indict a whole people, but perhaps we may learn how. This is not wholly absurd. Many philosophers have conceived the individual self as an ideal rather than a *datum*. Such a conception would be *a fortiori* even more applicable to over-individual wills.

To the objection that there "is no whit of evidence" for such conceptions, the reply is that it is not evidence for validity that is lacking, but evidence for certain images and analogies in terms of which the objects have been envisaged. We must look for evidence in the right place. Elsewhere I have maintained that knowledge of other minds is essentially valuing and such valuing includes and is the source of our certainty of other minds. This is *mutatis mutandis* true of over-individual minds and collective wills. But this is another story.

Wrath and Ruth. H. B. ALEXANDER.

The great war has been fought; the hour for reflection is come. What philosopher, in 1918, can write of human nature and achievement as he would have written in the spring of 1914? Looked at from the vantage of four years' experience, the ideals of 1914 seem shot

through with the bizarre, the puerile, the presumptuous. Then, man felt himself to be 'self-made'—and was proud of it. And from this self-made man, arrogant, conceited, came man-made war; and the bubble of human self-satisfaction was pricked, and the old idols overthrown,—among them, far from the least, the philosopher's idolatry of human reason. Reason is surely not the trusted guide men had deemed it! Further, the war, with its new experiences, brought new revelations of human character. Biology had taught that conduct is keyed to a selfish hedonism; but we find whole nations fighting with an unselfish enthusiasm. Right had been esteemed an insight of commonsense; but it was about diverse conceptions of right that men warred. Wrath and ruth, these are the two great facts of human nature which the war and its aftermath have brought out, showing us mortals to be out of gear with the world.

Ministers of consolation, to be sure, talk of the 'good' that will make the war a blessing, and 'justify' its loss of life and treasure. But to whom? Will not the blood of the slain cry out? the torments of the sufferers? Is the past non-existent? 'Democracy' . . . but is a race whom reason cannot guide worthy of democracy? Are we not, after all, slaves to our passions? 'A new religion' . . . but can religion be made to order and win belief? And is it not true that pugnacity is ineradicable in human nature? Ought we to expect everlasting peace? Is the universe pacifist? 'To err is human' . . . how deep, then, is the illusion? What kind of a world created me to deceive me? is it curst at the core? Is there no hold which reason or feeling or moral sense can secure? No sanity? No place where men can fall square with the world?

Philosophy must answer. "Tantum *scientia* potuit suadere malorum!" But at least we recognize the ills as ills. What, then, of the Good? This is our sole philosophic problem. Reason, feeling, moral sense, all these are *selective* in operation. But the end of selection is to *determine*, by some nature more profoundly ours than we realize. This we must fathom, or seek to fathom, even though the task be beset with apparent futility,—which is but another mode of saying that philosophy will continue to be cultivated while experience of the world continues. Nor is the fact of the final obliteration of humankind a reason for giving over: perchance the Good, like the recognized Evil, is of the present hour; and perchance our very condemnations are our fullest measures of this two-fold world, and our ruths, our penitences, our supreme credos. Wrath and ruth, righteous wrath and ruth, are themselves philosophy.

Teleology in a System of Knowledge. JOHN WARBEKE.

Teleological interpretations of supposedly objective, empirical relationships have little scientific odor of sanctity; but recent attempts to interpret the knowledge process as instrumental, or purposive with relation to other forms of behavior, etc., claim to be scientific and also raise important questions concerning the logical implications of such a method. The current vague use of the term 'teleology' necessitates specific reference to definite connotations in their limited contexts, and four types are considered: those of James-Schiller. Bergson, Kant, and Dewey, respectively. The first involves ethical ends which, becoming objects of desire, realize good purposes by active agency, the results effected by the process (good fruit, cash value, etc.) being the criteria by which epistemological validity is measured, The second method interprets experience in terms of changes which are regarded as expressions of some form of energy, producing effects recognized and measured as valuable, but not attributable to deliberative conscious agency. The rejection of Finalism and the positing of genuine creative activity in the *élan vital* heightens rather than diminishes its teleological character by ascribing mental or quasi-mental agencies to the ends attained in the course of evolution, not only psychologically, but ontologically. Kant's *Zweckmässigkeit*, or regulative principle by virtue of which every interpretation assumes a formal purpose, is a third type omitting both ethical ends and empirical objects of desire. A fourth type looks to the knowledge process as a means to the end of a prospective functioning of all human life to its maximum. It would abandon most of the traditional problems of philosophy in the interest of a practical achieving of good and avoidance of evil, the problem of error being simply the problem of evil. The last-named doctrine is comparable in many respects with the Socratic-mediæval anthropocentric teleology, the chief point of difference being that the latter assumes good ends to be a matter of faith or of accepted empirical data, while the former erects anticipated human good into a *method* whereby to deal with all situations for the attainment of knowledge. The teleological character of this method is not altered by any atomizing of good ends, and since for Dewey the distinction between subjective and objective does not obtain for experience (which is regarded as being quite as objective as any 'natural' process) there can be no assignable limit within which the good purposes of man may be said to determine the character of our world.

Realism and Perception. JAMES B. PRATT.

Sense perception is the stronghold of realism, yet neither naïve realism, Lockian dualism, nor neo-realism has been able to give a satisfactory account of it. The first and third of these can find no place for the indubitable facts of illusion and error, while Locke was unable to explain the possibility of veridical perception. This peculiar situation is due to an incomplete analysis of the perceptive process—an incomplete analysis in which not only the realists but the majority of the psychologists share. Most writers on the psychology of perception have contented themselves with a description of the (sensational and revived) content of the percept and the way in which this is built up. A few psychologists, however, notably Stout and Ward, have pointed out as an equally important aspect of the perceptive process an outer reference to an object conceived as existing independently of the perceiver. This outer reference is both a meaning and the conscious correlate of a tendency to reaction. The child's notion of an external, dynamic world grows up hand-in-hand with his notion of himself, and his attitude toward this world is a genuine part of his perceptive process. It is a dynamic and independently existing object which one means, and toward which one tends to react in perception. The percept is thus only one aspect of perception, and its function is to act as a token of the presence of an independent object and to prompt us to reach towards it. The bearing of this view of perception upon epistemological theory is considerable. For a realism which makes the distinction suggested between content and object of perception is able to avoid both the difficulties which all three of the other forms of realism have found so insuperable. Since real things rather than 'ideas' are recognized as our objects, knowledge of reality and veridical perception again become possible; and for the same reason a place is also found for the possibility of mistake and illusion.

Principia Analytica. H. M. SHEFFER.

Deductive systems, it is well known, may be determined by means of postulate-sets in various ways. Euclidean geometry, for example, is determined by the widely different postulate-sets of Hilbert, of Veblen, and of Huntington. These distinct determinations are all 'equivalent'—any two of the postulate-sets are uniquely intertranslatable. May there not be, then, a set of 'superpostulates,' of which Hilbert's, Veblen's, Huntington's, and other postulate-sets are special cases? There is. And, as a matter of fact, the 'invariant' of these postulate-sets turns out to be of an extraordinarily simple character.

This concept of the invariant of a postulate-set for any deductive system is employed by the writer (1) in formulating the Theory of Postulational Technique, the Theory of Relativistic Physics, and the Theory of Epistemological Constructions (such as those of Russell and of Whitehead), and (2) in reconstructing the Foundations of Mathematical Logic.

Officers of the Association: President, H. B. Alexander; Vice-President, James B. Pratt; Secretary-Treasurer; H. A. Overstreet; Executive Committee, in addition to the officers just mentioned, Miss Savilla Elkus (1919), Warner Fite (1919), W. M. Urban (1920), E. C. Wilm, (1921), W. G. Everett (1921), A. W. Moore (1921). Special Committees:—Terminology, A. O. Lovejoy, Chairman; Early American Philosophers, I. Woodbridge Riley, Chairman; International Coöperation, A. C. Armstrong, Chairman; Organization and Attendance, J. H. Tufts, Chairman.

LIST OF MEMBERS.

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Adler, Professor Felix, Columbia University, New York.
Aikins, Professor H. A., Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, O.
Albee, Professor Ernest, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
Alexander, Professor H. B., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
Ames, Professor E. S., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Angier, Dr. R. P., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Apple, President Henry A., Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa.
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van Becelaere, Rev. E. L., Convent of the Visitation, Georgetown, Ky.
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Brightman, Professor Edgar Sheffield, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.
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Case, Professor Mary S., Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
Castro, Dr. Matilde, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
Cattell, Professor J. McKeen, Garrison-on-Hudson, N. Y.
Chandler, Dr. Albert R., Ohio State University, Columbus, O.
Coe, Professor George A., 606 W. 122d St., New York.
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Costello, Dr. H. T., Columbia University, New York.
Cox, Professor George Clarke, 128 North Mountain Ave., Montclair, N. J.
Crane, Miss E., Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio.
Crawford, Professor J. Forsyth, Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.
Creighton, Professor J. E., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
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Dunham, Dr. James H., The Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
Dunlap, Professor Knight, Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, Md.
Edman, Dr. Irwin, Columbia University, New York.
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Everett, Professor Walter G., Brown Univ., Providence, R. I.
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Fisher, Dr. D. Warren, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
Fite, Professor Warner, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
Flaccus, Professor Louis William, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Fletcher, Professor O. O., Furman University, Greenville, S. C.
Fogel, Professor Philip H., Bureau of War Risk Insurance, Washington, D. C.
Franklin, Mrs. Christine Ladd, 527 West 110th St., New York.
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Gardiner, Professor H. N., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
Gifford, Professor A. R., University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt.
Gillett, Professor A. L., Hartford Theol. Sem., Hartford, Conn.
Gore, Professor Willard Clark, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Griffin, Professor E. H., Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, Md.
Guthrie, Dr. E. R., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
Guthrie, Dr. Kenneth S., 292 Henry St., New York.
Hall, Professor T. C., Union Theological Seminary, New York.
Hammond, Professor W. A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
Hartman, Dr. Henry L., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, O.
Henderson, Professor Ernest N., Adelphi College, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Henke, Professor Frederick G., Allegheny College, Meadville, Pa.
Hibben, President J. G., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
Hill, President A. Ross, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
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Hite, Professor L. F., New Church Theol. Sch., Cambridge, Mass.
Hocking, Professor W. E., Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass.
Hoernlé, Professor R. F. A., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Hoffman, Professor Frank S., Union College, Schenectady, N. Y.
Hollands, Professor E. H., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.

Holmes, Professor Jesse Herman, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
Horne, Professor H. H., New York University, New York.
Howes, Dr. Ethel Puffer, Scarsdale, N. Y.
Hudson, Professor J. W., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
Hughes, Professor Percy, Lehigh Univ., South Bethlehem, Pa.
Hume, Professor J. G., University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
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Johnson, Professor R. B. C., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
Jones, Professor A. H., Brown University, Providence, R. I.
Jones, Professor A. L., Columbia University, New York.
Jones, Professor Rufus M., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.
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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. XVIII. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the thirty-ninth Session, 1917–18. London. Williams and Norgate, 1918—pp. 655.

This volume is a remarkable testimony to the vitality of philosophical interest and activity in Great Britain. Seventeen meetings of the Society were held during the year, and seventeen papers contributed, together with three symposia and three shorter communications. All of these papers are included in this volume, with the exception of those belonging to the symposium on the question, Why is the 'Unconscious' unconscious? which is published in the *British Journal of Psychology* (October, 1918). When it is remembered that the volume before us is a record of the work of the Society during the fourth year of the great war, with all its terrible trials and strain, one cannot refrain from expressing admiration for the steadfastness and courage of the group of scholars who kept alive the torch of philosophy in such unpropitious times, and when burdened with many heavy and unusual tasks. It is interesting to read that despite the enormous amount of public work which fell upon them, Mr. Balfour and Lord Haldane were able to preside at two of the meetings. Professor H. Wildon Carr was for the third successive year the president of the Society, and to him doubtless belongs a large measure of credit for the success of the session.

The papers of this volume are representative of all the more important phases of philosophy. Of the two symposia here reported, one dealt with the question, "Are Physical, Biological and Psychological Categories Irreducible?" and papers were contributed by J. S. Haldane, D'Arcy W. Thompson, P. Chalmers Mitchell, and L. T. Hobhouse. The other had as its subject, "Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" and papers are published from B. Bosanquet, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, G. F. Stout, and Lord Haldane. There are three historical papers: "Indian Ideas of Action and their Interest for Modern Thinking," by F. W. Thomas; "The 'Modes of Spinoza' and the 'Monads of Leibniz,'" by G. Dawes Hicks; and "The Philosophy of Proclus," by A. E. Taylor. Two papers deal with political philosophy: "Realism and Politics," by

J. W. Scott; and "The Conception of a Unitary Social Order," by H. J. W. Hetherington. Four are somewhat distinctly theological in character: "The Theory of a Limited Deity," by Charles F. D'Arcy; "Omnipotence," by F. C. S. Schiller; "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," by Albert A. Cock; and "The Moral Argument for the Existence of God," by W. R. Mathews. Three papers may be classified as psychological: "Behaviour as a Psychological Concept," by Arthur Robinson; "On the Summation of Pleasures," by Dorothy Winch; and "Association," by Arthur Lynch. There remain the presidential address on "The Interaction of Mind and Body"; "Thought and Intuition," by Karin Stephen; "The Development of Criticism," by F. C. Bartlett; "The Conception of Reality," by G. E. Moore; "Is There a Mathematics of Intensity," by J. A. Smith; "Anthropomorphism and Truth," by J. B. Baillie; "Practical Dualism," by E. E. Constance Jones; and "Space-Time," by S. Alexander.

It is clearly impossible in a review to give even a brief summary of the content of all of these papers, even if one were at home in all these different fields. I shall call attention only to those that happen most to have interested me.

The presidential address with which Professor Carr opened the work of the session, continues, as he tells us, the consideration of the subject which formed the basis of his two previous addresses on similar occasions—the subject of the relation of mind and body. He believes that new facts have lately been established concerning the nature of the mind and the body which will contribute to a more satisfactory theory of their relation. Of these, the most important seems to be the fact, which he regards as established beyond question, that some disorders of the psycho-physical organism, are psychological in origin. This makes it impossible any longer to conceive of the mind as the concomitant of certain nervous changes in the body. "The mind has a structure of its own. It is an integration of coördinated psychical elements or processes—personal memories, tendencies, desires, wishes, and the like—which mutually repress or inhibit one another; or, as the case may be, interplay with and evoke one another. This psychical matter has an organization as complete, and a unity of living process as perfect, as the physiological matter of the body. The mind is not an intermittent consciousness lighting up with awareness certain states of the organism and dependent on particular physiological processes. It is a structure which can suffer injury, derangement or disorder, independently of the physical derangement of the

body. If, then, there be interaction between soul and body, it by no means follows that parts or constituents of the soul must interact with parts or constituents of the body; it may be that the whole soul, or the soul as an individual, interacts with the whole body as a self-controlled unity of coördinated mechanisms" (pp. 2–3).

This is the theory which Professor Carr supports by appeal to fact and argument throughout this paper. No one can doubt that it represents a great advance over the older interactionism and parallelism, which used to be set out as the sole alternatives. But one may accept this more concrete view of the relation of mind and body without connecting it with Bergsonian metaphysics, as Professor Carr does. Mind and body, he tells us, are antithetical principles representing the dichotomy of an original unity, and appearing in the mutually exclusive forms of freedom and necessity. Now if this is true, one must ask where is the basis to be found of that 'solidarity' of mind and body on which Professor Carr insists. Life in this view is a progressive dichotomy; and it is evident then that there is no basis of unity or 'solidarity' to be found in the process itself, or in its end. One must, as always in the Bergsonian metaphysics, look back to the beginning to justify the unity and connectedness of diversity.

The symposium on the relations of physical, biological, and psychological categories, contains matter of much interest. The formulation of the problem has the advantage of bringing into the foreground what is often overlooked in discussions of this central problem, that the categories of the various sciences are assumptions implicated in the particular form of the questions which they severally raise, and must be interpreted in the light of these questions. Their value in any situation depends upon the completeness of the form of answer to which they lead. It is because the requirement of intelligibility assumes new forms, and makes further demands, as one proceeds from the physical to the living and conscious, that the mechanical categories have to give way to others more adequate to the demands of the new situations. This seems to be very clearly recognized in the arguments of Dr. Haldane and Professor Hobhouse, while their opponents, as is unfortunately too common with representatives of the special sciences, seem inclined to regard mechanism as an absolute form of intelligibility, or at least as affording the only objectively verifiable form of answer to which human reason can attain. It is worth while to have the issues thus sharpened.

The title of the problem that formed the subject of the second symposium reported in this volume is taken from Professor Pringle-

Pattison's book, *The Idea of God*, where he protests against the Spinozistic use of the term substance and the description of all "provisional substances as predicates" or "adjectives" of "the one true individual Real." All the parties to the discussion however acknowledge the inadequacy of the formula, 'substantial' or 'adjectival,' to express the opposition between the two points of view here under discussion. Dr. Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison are the chief protagonists, and the point at issue may be said to be the different emphasis and interpretation which each has given to the reality of the individual in recently published Gifford Lectures. In spite of the fact that there is much that these two writers recognize in common, there are also fundamental differences in their ultimate attitude and conclusions, and these are here restated with great force and clearness. In general, Professor Pringle-Pattison emphasizes more the existential unity of the individual self with its 'given' ends and demands; while Dr. Bosanquet finds the ground of its reality in its principle of self-transcendence, which is identified only in terms of a universal content. Professor Stout, who appears on the whole to agree more nearly with Pringle-Pattison, seems to me to make an important contribution to the discussion by his criticism of some logical doctrines which are common to Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet. And Lord Haldane's admirable review of the discussion contains valuable suggestions as to the means by which the impasse between the One and the Many may be avoided. He holds that the difficulties of the system of Professor Pringle-Pattison on the one hand, and of Dr. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley on the other—the incomprehensibility of the Absolute —to which both views seem to lead—has its source in the fact that both alike cling to 'relational' forms of knowing, and fail to make adequate use of the speculative categories of reason.

The article by Professor Baillie, entitled "Anthropomorphism and Truth," has also certain bearings on the questions at issue in the symposium just described, but it also represents a point of view which seems to me especially fresh and interesting. It is to be hoped that it will lead to further discussion, and that the author may see fit to proceed to develop his position. In defining this position in opposition to contemporary views, he says: "In our own time we find those who, laying stress on the independence of truth, treat the human mind as but a medium in which truth is intermittently realized or focused; the mind is subordinate to the truth, and shapes its conscious process in terms of an 'objective' order or system. In inevitable reaction from this position, there are those who consider that truth is not

independent of the mind, that truth is at best but subordinate to and dominated by the prior practical interests of the mind, a mere instrument for its purposes. . . . The assumption in the one case is that the individual mind is always qualified by a particular element which either is, or should be, in process of dissolution into the universality characteristic of truth; the assumption in the other case is that the particular element is in itself precious to the individual, and neither can nor should be surrendered to the claims of a universal which, however important, is always 'abstract' and incapable of doing full justice to what is particular" (pp. 186–87). Both of these points of view ignore the nature of individuality as essentially development, and also that "behind the processes of both practical action and intellectual procedure lies the more ultimate reality of the single indivisible individuality itself." It is the whole mind as a developing individuality which gives the key to the nature of experience, and it is in terms of it that truth is to be understood. "Individuality prescribes the course which thought has to take, not thought the character which individuality should possess." What is necessary, I think, is that Professor Baillie shall give some further account of what he calls "the solid integrity of the mind's life." One may readily grant that the abstracting process of the intellect is only one of its forms or functions, and yet hold that as a concrete universal its unity is in a real sense logical. And though agreeing with his contention that truth is nothing 'transcendent,' I find difficulty in accepting the 'anthropomorphic' interpretation which he has given of it.

Under the title of "Realism and Politics," Mr. J. W. Scott calls attention to a connection between "a phase of current thought and a phase of current social theory," taking Russell and Bergson as representatives of 'Realism.' "Realism is not the view that things are nonmental. It is the view which treats the question of their position in the best arrangement, the best 'place for the soul,' that the universe will make, as quite indifferent to the question of their reality. It is the view that the most indubitably real is the most nearly non-constructed." The thesis of this interesting article is that there is a connection between the realistic temper of mind in philosophy and certain contemporary social movements which take as their standard the immediate and narrow demands of the bare will, without any attempt to harmonize or coördinate them in the light of a broader human principle. The paper by Professor Hetherington on "The Conception of a Unitary Social Order" forms an excellent complement to this article, and is in itself an admirably clear statement of the classical view of the state as the expression of a 'General Will.'

I regret that no space remains to comment on the other papers contained in this volume, several of which are of great interest and importance. One cannot help being impressed both by the range of interest represented by the activities of the Aristotelian Society during the past year, and by the scholarly character of the papers which have been produced. I can only close by expressing congratulations, and wishing for the Society a long continuance of such distinguished achievement as is represented by the papers of the thirty-ninth session.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Creative Intelligence. Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude. By JOHN DEWEY, ADDISON W. MOORE, HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN, GEORGE H. MEAD, BOYD H. BODE, HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART, JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS, HORACE M. KALLEN. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1917.—pp. iv, 467.

This volume of essays by eight representative American Pragmatists is characterized in the preface as follows: It "presents a unity in attitude rather than a uniformity in results. . . . The reader will note that the Essays endeavor to embody the common attitude in application to specific fields of inquiry which have been historically associated with philosophy rather than as a thing by itself. Beginning with philosophy itself, subsequent contributions discuss its application to logic, to mathematics, to physical science, to psychology, to ethics, to economics, and then again to philosophy itself in conjunction with esthetics and religion. The reader will probably find that the significant points of agreement have to do with the ideas of the genuineness of the future, of intelligence as the organ for determining the quality of that future so far as it can come within human control, and of a courageously inventive individual as the bearer of a creatively employed mind."

Professor John Dewey opens the volume with an essay on "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy." The recovery will take place when philosophy substitutes for an outworn and largely false view of 'experience' one which is congenial to present conditions, and an interpretation which, instead of being forced upon the word, "experience suggests about itself" (p. 7). The contrast between the inherited account of experience and the one relevant to modern life is considered under five heads: (1) Experience is not primarily knowledge, but intercourse of a living being with his physical and social environment; (2) it is not subjective, but objective; (3) it is not a

"registration of what has taken place," but experimental and forward-looking; (4) it is not atomistic, but "pregnant with connexions"; (5) it is not opposed to thought, but constantly and by nature full of inference.

The second essay by Professor Addison W. Moore is entitled "Reformation of Logic." "The present task of logical theory," says the writer, "is the restoration of the continuity of the act and agent of knowing with other acts and agents" (p. 77). Two "ancient disabilities" of logic must be overcome: the leaving of an absolute breach between non-logical and logical acts, in which case a 'universal' or 'idea' tends to be held "as an object of contemplation and of worshipful adoration," and (2) the reading down of logical attributes into non-logical experience. The latter is the fallacy of idealistic logic and is the realization of continuity in experience at the expense of a real distinction. The conception of growth by means of which immediate experience is seen to 'become' what it is not at first, that is, reflective, sets the parts of experience in their right relations.

In the third essay, "Intelligence and Mathematics," Professor Harold Chapman Brown shows by the aid of a good deal of anthropological material that mathematics like all other sciences springs from the needs of man in adapting himself to his environment. The writer follows the "progress of self-conscious theory" down to the application of algebra to geometry by Descartes. In the discussion of the mathematical logic of Messrs. Whitehead and Russell, he insists that the use of symbols is possible in an advanced stage of abstraction only because those symbols applied in the first instance to real things. His emphasis throughout is upon the likeness in kind between mathematics and the natural sciences.

In "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker," Professor George H. Mead insists upon the 'experimental' nature of the movement of science. The ancients treated single happenings as belonging to a system, an individual, or an essence. Upon their view the 'nature' of all things was 'given,' and the task of the scientist was merely that of accurate classification. Modern science, on the other hand, takes seriously the 'fact' or isolated thing, which will not fall under any theory, and which may by its insubordination overthrow an earlier hypothesis. It also does justice to the participation of the individual thinker in the progress of science. The kingdom of science is within men, and not in some reality apart.

That psychology is properly a science of behavior is the main theme of Professor Boyd H. Bode's essay on "Consciousness and

Psychology." But the 'behavior' of psychology is of a distinctive kind, and must be marked off from the subject-matter of physiology and physics. "Control by a future that is made present is what constitutes consciousness" (p. 242), and the present conscious situation is characterized by expectancy and uncertainty. The interpretation of consciousness as functional, dynamic, objective, and experimental necessitates the abandonment of various methods and conceptions which deny these qualities to consciousness: The method of introspection is subjective and preserves an attenuated form of the 'soul' of traditional psychology; psycho-physical parallelism virtually makes the mental of no account; the notion of focus and margin, when taken in terms of static structure, is partly based on a false analogy with vision.

In the sixth article Professor Henry Waldgrave Stuart discusses "The Phases of the Economic Interest." Changes in economic needs and interests in the individual indicate a change in the personality as a whole; the new acquisitions do not satisfy preëxistent demands; neither are they utterly lacking in meaning for the old self. But the individual or society mounts to a new level of experience with the attainment of novel economic satisfaction. The writer's term for economic activity —'constructive comparison'—is intended "to suggest that the process is in the nature of adventure, not calculation, and, on the other hand, that though adventurous it is not sheer hazard uncontrolled" (p. 309). The reigning Austrian theory which makes of economics a mere matter of accounting neglects the "qualitative uniqueness and the integral character of personal budgets" (p. 317, note).

Professor James Hayden Tufts bases his interpretation of "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards" neither upon a mere study of concepts nor upon descriptive anthropology, but upon the appearance of standards within the "process of forming and reshaping ideals" (p. 357). "We must . . . take as our starting-point the conviction that moral life is a process involving physical life, social intercourse, measuring and constructive intelligence" (p. 404). These are the 'factors'; the nature of good and right are defined in relation to them. 'Good' is objective as a value, not as an essence or physical fact, and its relation to other values depends in part upon the social factor. "Right is not merely a means to the good but has an independent place in the moral consciousness," and this place is determined by reference to a moving and social standard. Emotion and intellect fuse in the formation of moral judgments. The Prag-

matic view of the moral consciousness, in contrast with Professor Fite's, is objective and dynamic.

"Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and Religion" is the subject of the final essay by Dr. Horace M. Kallen. 'The problem of evil' is best understood in the light of its psychological origin. The numerous fundamental instincts in man call for satisfactions which the world does not *prima facie* furnish. In the face of this disappointment and obstruction the mind seeks or creates substitutes for itself. The tragedy of the world is the necessity of accepting something different from the original object of desire. "Dreams, some of the arts, religion, and philosophy may indeed be considered as such fulfilments, worlds of luxuriant self-realization of all that part of our nature which harsh conjunctions with the environment overthrow and suppress" (p. 422). Unity, spirituality, and eternity are traits of the perfect universe which man imaginatively constructs, and freedom and immortality are compensatory values which he attributes to himself.

Such in very brief summary are the statements of the application of Pragmatic theory to various fields.

It did not seem necessary to reproduce the essays in greater detail; the "common attitude" is not only the matter of chief importance, but when it is once thoroughly grasped the applications follow almost of themselves. We have already noticed to what elements in this attitude the authors themselves wish to call attention. There is in evidence, however, a more general mark of the Pragmatic position by which it has from the first been distinguished. This is the Pragmatists' belief that they are the first to do justice to things as they are, that they alone among philosophers report the nature of the real world in its full complexity and movement. 'Facts,' 'life,' 'experience,' 'the concrete,' are their peculiar possession; philosophy has too long concerned itself with abstractions, unproved assumptions, dead and formal hypotheses and problems, and fictions of the imagination. Examples of this feeling of superior closeness to reality may be found in numerous passages throughout the book.

To Pragmatism (and biology, with which it shares the glory) is due all the credit of making effective use of the conception of the 'organic' in the interpretation of experience (p. 20). The name of Professor Dewey is connected with the discovery of the part played by emotion in the formation of judgments of right, as if the world owed this truth also to Pragmatism (p. 389). "Tangible meaning and practical importance" in the interpretation of growth and change come from

Pragmatism. Idealism, committed as it is to the 'latent' and 'implicit' cannot account for genuine development (p. 297). Pragmatism "drops the pretense of envisaging the universe," and "frankly acknowledges the realities of immediate experience" (pp. 467, 466). Speculative philosophers have been guilty of "the more than technical blunder" of substituting "the otiose insight gained by manipulation of a formula for the slow coöperative work of a humanity guided by reflective intelligence." We are to infer that the latter effective method is that of Pragmatism (p. 28). Idealists have spent all their spiritual substance (if we may believe the account of the Pragmatists) in "disingenuous apologetics," in explaining away real experience.

Because this claim of superior faithfulness in reporting reality is made by all philosophers who take themselves seriously, and who believe that they are the first to know the whole truth, it is worth while once more to examine in what sense, and by virtue of what affirmations and exclusions, the Pragmatists are closer to the facts than anyone else. For it is evident that the 'experience' that they report has a distinctive and describable nature; not all qualifications attach with equal validity to the world as it appears to the Pragmatist. Even he has predilections and assumptions.

In general, then, it is true that the Pragmatic philosophy draws its substance—the material upon which it operates—from the contemporary industrial, political, and scientific movements. This at once implies that it does not draw its significance from the life of philosophy hitherto. "This essay," says Professor Dewey, who opens the volume with a general discussion of the work of Pragmatism, "[is] an attempt to forward the emancipation of philosophy from too intimate and exclusive attachment to traditional problems." Too much emphasis has been laid on past thought, old antitheses, old problems and their solutions. What is called for is "direct preoccupation with contemporary difficulties." Philosophy must not be side-tracked from the main currents of contemporary life. But in the next breath Professor Dewey hastens to add that we must keep something of philosophical tradition. We do not want too much of it, but something of it is necessary. By what standard then do we distinguish what has value in the history of philosophy from what is an unprofitable accumulation of words? It appears that we are to retain such parts of the tradition as are useful to outsiders. Scientists and business men shall determine in large measure the content of philosophy (see p. 5). Philosophy, in a word, is a serving-woman, as in the middle ages, and is valued as an instrument, but does not properly determine its own ends (p. 14).

The Pragmatist views all things in the light of existing science and social practice.

Nobody doubts that philosophy should bring its full powers to bear on contemporary problems. But the question is whether philosophy has or has not any inner life or positive content by means of which it at once attains self-expression and also the capacity to stimulate other kinds of life and thought. An examination of the references throughout this volume to some of the outstanding traditional philosophies suggests the hypothesis that Pragmatists do not believe in the history of philosophy because they have not thoroughly appropriated it. It is evident, for example, that a philosopher is scarcely repaid for time spent with Kant who comes away from it with the conviction that "Kant recognized no functional relationship between the nature of the *Mannigfaltigkeit* of sensuous perception and the forms into which it was poured" (p. 194). Again, we are told that Kant's view of experience was no substantial advance on the sensationalism of Hume (p. 17). Hegel is allowed to be more concrete, "and yet in the Hegelian logic, the movement is always away from the perceptual experience toward the higher realm of the *Idee*. . . . Thought is . . . a great process of realization in which this world is forever transcended" (p. 196). These are, of course, the conventional and external observations to make about these philosophies. Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza fare no better in the hands of these prophets of 'contemporary movements.' The lack of historical sense assumes its most offensive form in the final essay on "Value and Existence." It is scarcely credible that any school of thinkers should entrust the treatment of religion, art, and the general significance of philosophy to one who refers to most of the serious career of philosophy—"any idealistic system from Plato to Bradley"—as somnambulism, and who draws an analogy between traditional idealism and paranoia (p. 436). The writer of this article says that "much of the underlying motive of the doctrine [of immortality] is a *sehnsucht* and nostalgia after the absent dead," and that Spinoza preserves the form if not the substance of this passion (p. 433). It is difficult to find this preserved form. Perhaps the reference is to Spinoza's use of the word "eternity." The same writer speaks of "the historic accident we call Christianity" (p. 433) and refers to the history of philosophy as an unvarying succession of attempts to *prove* the falsehood that the contents of daily life are value-forms (p. 435). In the light of the unsympathetic treatment of the history of philosophy throughout the book, Professor Dewey's remark that "It would also be a grateful task to dwell upon the precious

contributions made by the philosophic systems which as a whole are impossible," and his reference to "the fertile and ample ideas of a Spinoza, a Kant, or a Hegel" (p. 6), strike one as homage which is more verbal than real.

There is then this fatal contradiction at the very heart of the Pragmatic position. While its representatives profess to keep closer to 'experience' and the 'real world' than any previous group of thinkers, in reality they are guilty of the very abstractness against which they inveigh. Philosophy is committed, as they insist, to an examination of the world as it is, to reality in its connections, continuity, and development. But this complete view has not been hid from the patient and progressive reflection of more than two thousand years to be now suddenly revealed to contemporary science and industry. Pragmatists profess to stand over against the whole evolution of philosophical thought; and then by the standard of some test that they draw from the problems of the present time propose to select here a bit and there a bit that is true and valuable. They have not sunk themselves within the movement of philosophy and learned its progress in reasonableness; they know at once from the 'strains' and 'conflicts' of 'immediate experience' what problems are genuine and worth working at.

Connected with the abstractness of the Pragmatists' interpretation of the function and achievement of philosophy is the abstractness of their view of the human mind. Just as philosophy springs for them full-orbed out of the immediate context, without any traceable intellectual ancestry, so the human being seems to be explicable in terms of present wants and desires,[1] and to lack those larger feelings which exhibit his universal nature. For example, man is not credited with such a disinterested emotion as 'wonder,' the root in humanity of all speculative philosophy. Rather we are told that "Thinking—worse luck!—came into being as response to discomfort, to pain, to uncertainty, to problems" (p. 409). We think, apparently, because we are driven like hirelings to it, not because of a spontaneous impulse to assert our kinship with something greater beyond ourselves. Intelli-

[1] Professor Tufts says (p. 407) that "only wilful misinterpretation will suppose that the method here set forth is that of taking every want or desire as itself a final justification." However, even at the risk of being accused of "wilful misinterpretation," I must still say that I cannot discover that Pragmatism succeeds in explaining mind by anything in principle different from particular desires and impulses. The fact that it claims to operate upon these particulars with a refined type of calculation which aims, as Professor Tufts says, to reckon with all the factors in the situation, does not seem to require one to alter the above estimate of the Pragmatic theory of the constitution and significance of mind.

gence, from the Pragmatic point of view, is skill in the manipulation of concepts (p. 120). The function of reflection is to assist "in that control of the world which secures a prosperous and significant expansion of experience" (p. 25). In plain words, its function is consideration of consequences, calculation of advantage. "Experience is an affair of facilitations and checks, . . . of good fortune and defeat in . . . countless qualitative modes." (p. 16). There is only scorn for those "pietists who persist in arguing that the trouble which we do encounter in this vale of tears springs from the inwardness of our own natures" (p. 409). But there are a good many conceptions, vital to large numbers of people, for which there is no room in the Pragmatists' philosophical edifice. They speak indeed of courage—for example, in the phrase, "courageously inventive individual"—but this 'courage' always seems to be exercised in view of some advantage to be obtained either for the individual or the group, and to approximate in its significance 'interested aggression.' There is a courage which is self-effacing, and which may manifest itself either as active wrath or as patient fortitude. None of the virtues associated with the acceptance of the universe as a whole are recognized by Pragmatists: acquiescence of mind, grace, humility.

The explanation of this second abstractness in the Pragmatists' view seems to be that for him man is in the last resort nothing more than a psycho-physical organism. Self-consciously proud of the fact that their view transcends mere mechanism, they yet usually fall back upon 'connections of neurones' and 'biological adjustment' for their definite explanation of the nature of consciousness. How, Professor Bode inquires, may we distinguish consciousness from the ordinary reflex? "Conscious behavior," he tells us, "involves a certain *process* of organization which constitutes a differential. The units entering into this process are 'definitely organized systems of neural discharge'" (p. 237). "The *a priori* element in human experience," says Professor Dewey, "is activities made possible by means of established connections of neurones" (p. 19). "Man is, after all, rational only because through his nervous system he can hold his immediate responses in check and finally react as a being that has had experiences and profited by them" (Professor Brown, p. 174).

But the total nature of man can not be expressed in terms of stimulus and response. The logic of Pragmatism does not allow for more, and yet 'the concrete,' 'experience,' 'things as they are' show more than will compress into so limited a theory. There are many inconsistent hints of a larger reality in these essays: "the essential connexion of

intelligence . . . with possibilities involving a transfiguration" (p. 29); again, "From some source beyond the scope and nature of the earlier function a suggestion or an impulsion has come by which the agent has endeavored to move forward" (p. 293); again, "A spontaneous constructive interest stands more or less constantly ready in us" (p. 299); again: "its [the mind's] use in bettering life" (p. 28); again, "The only truly general, the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the *generous* thought" (p. 389). Reflection upon some of the conceptions here suggested—'transfiguration,' 'sources beyond,' 'spontaneity,' 'life,' 'generosity,' inevitably lead to a more comprehensive theory of the nature of philosophy and of the human mind. Taken by themselves these statements seem to indicate on the part of the writers a recognition of the higher levels of experience. But the conceptions involve a juster view of the place and work of the individual thinker and of the present age in the history of thought than Pragmatism can consistently furnish, and a more respectful attitude toward the actually existing universe which it would so lightly change for the better.

KATHERINE E. GILBERT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The Processes of History. By FREDERICK J. TEGGART. New Haven, The Yale University Press, 1918.—pp. ix, 162.

This book is a sequel to the author's *Prolegomena to History* noticed in this REVIEW, Vol. XXVI, p. 228. The former volume was an examination and criticism of the rather voluminous literature dealing with the nature of history, and expressed the writer's conviction that the work of historians had been dominated by the construction of narrative rather than by a scientific formulation of fact. In the earlier book Professor Teggart promised a more constructive outline of the task of history, and the present work is the fulfillment of that promise.

The thesis of the book may be expressed in general somewhat as follows: History to-day needs some such revolution (though the analogy must not be pushed too far) as Darwin wrought in the biological sciences. Political history, the history of culture, philosophy, economics,—the humanistic studies generally,—need to be drawn together about one principle in the same fashion as organic evolution brought together paleontology, embryology, and comparative anatomy. More particularly, facts within each of these humanistic sciences need to be brought together by what might be called a dynamic explanatory principle, as natural selection brought together a

mass of previously unrelated facts about the breeding and distribution of plants and animals. Along with this tightening of logical relationship, there must be a broadening of the field to escape the provincialism of history as written for men of European culture alone. In short, the problem of history is to show "how man in all his diversity has come to be as we find him now," just as Darwin's problem may be said to have been to show how organic structure came to be diversified as it is. Like Darwin also the historian must assume innumerable series of historical events and that all things have come to be as they are by the continued operation of natural processes.

The title of Professor Teggart's book is therefore descriptive of the procedure of history as he conceives it. History is a search for 'processes' or, as the biologist more commonly calls them, the 'factors' of change. Nor is the historian's work, more than the biologist's, the mere description of factual changes. The processes sought are forces operative always and everywhere; the problem is one of comparison and generalization. The human story, wherever told, is of one piece, held together in its most general aspects by the features of the physical environment. Thus throughout the world we find political organization arising at the termini of routes of travel which are marked out by the configuration of the land or the nature of soil and climate. Moreover, the movements of men along these routes, at least in masses, are determined probably by alterations in the equilibrium between population and the means of subsistence. These factors form the permanent background of history, though they are by no means the only factors or perhaps the ones most vital to historical explanation.

The heart of the problem lies in the human factors of history, in the natural processes of human nature. The argument at this point is somewhat involved, but if I grasp it, it runs as follows: In most general terms, there are two types of human organization, that according to kinship and that according to territory. The latter is the specifically political type of organization, and since political organization arises at the termini of routes of travel, the physical and human factors are correlated at this point. The physical factors determine the lines of movement and the termini of the movements are the points of strain between different races and cultures. Migration breaks down the primitive organization by blood relationship and brings about organization by territory or ownership of soil. The concept of property may be said to be the heart of the new organization. The problem of history is to untangle the factors which appear

in the transition from one type of organization to the other. The outstanding feature of the transition is the liberation of spontaneous, individual activity, since organization by kinship means the domination of the individual by habit and tradition. The breaking up of this type of organization takes place mainly, if not altogether, as a result of the meeting and conflict of different cultures. When ceremonies can no longer be performed at the places and in the manner prescribed by custom, the individual is forced to criticize and to act on his own initiative. In its most inclusive sense, therefore, history is the study of the changes by which systems of ideas have come to be as they are, the chief factor in these changes being the conflicts between different systems of ideas.

It should be said that Professor Teggart presents these generalizations in no dogmatic vein, being quite as ready as one could wish to recognize their tentative nature; so far as their agreement with fact is concerned, he presents them only as what he takes to be the drift of the evidence. Aside from difficulties of evidence, however, there are serious difficulties of definition which he certainly does not ignore but which he perhaps does not recognize quite so clearly. To mention only one such difficulty, what are we to take, in any given case, as constituting a release of individual initiative? That the present-day European is freer than the member of a savage tribe is perhaps true, but if all the qualifications were made, it seems doubtful if much meaning would be left in the original generalization. The European is free in many ways which would have no meaning at all for the savage, and on the other hand he is bound in many ways that the savage is never conscious of. Certainly for any definite period of history it is practically impossible to decide whether individual initiative has grown or diminished on the whole. Is a man freer to-day than a century ago? In the matter of religious practice he probably is; in the management of some kinds of property he almost certainly is not. Until we have some way of measuring spontaneity as against tradition, the utility of such a formula as Professor Teggart's is rather doubtful.

Whatever its utility may be, however, one feels that it at any rate introduces a point of view somewhat different from that taken when the geographical factors are under discussion. Increase of liberty can scarcely be a factor in the same sense as diminished rain-fall. Nor does the analogy with Darwin's work seem to hold in this case. There seems to be no more reason why the processes of history should produce individual spontaneity as a rule, than why natural selection should produce differentiation of structure as a rule. The latter

point of view seems to introduce an element of valuation into the work of the historian for which Professor Teggart does not find a place and which he appears to condemn. One suspects that this is a phase of the humanistic sciences which refuses to be eliminated, a phase, moreover, which is intimately connected with Professor Teggart's liberal conception of all these sciences as being concerned with systems of ideas.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris. A Chapter in the History of American Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By R. M. WENLEY. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1917.—pp. xv, 332.

Professor Wenley has accomplished a difficult task with rare skill and success. The meaning of his sub-title is amplified in the following statement from his preface, where, speaking of Professor Morris, he says:—"His intellectual history, despite its sudden end, epitomizes that of many minds in his day, because it embodies a representative human experience peculiar to the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the English-speaking world." Mr. Wenley's achievement is measured by the fact that his biography actually sets forth in a living form this epitome of a great intellectual experience of the later nineteenth century. The reader is not simply told about it. The development of the generation, its intellectual transition and struggle, is depicted as it was embodied in a personality of wonderful sincerity. Sympathetic insight, delicacy of touch, fidelity of portraiture, have combined with hard work and an understanding of the spiritual questionings characteristic of the transition out of Puritan Evangelicism, to produce a work which is both a faithful biography of an unusual human soul and a contribution of signal value to the history of American thought. The task was not made easy by materials ready at hand. In Professor Morris, the traditional constraint and self-consciousness of New England Puritanism had been sublimated into a spiritual detachment from all that narrowly concerned his own ego. He had learned to consume his own smoke, to transmute his personal experiences into something of impersonal meaning, and he would have found it indelicate and impossible to dwell on the incidents of his personal history. As a consequence, it was hard to gather together even the main external facts of his life, to say nothing of the intellectual crises through which he passed. Professor Wenley's scholarly *pietas* surmounted the difficulties. The result is a book which it is to be hoped will serve as a precedent for later records of other American scholars and teachers. There are traditions which are harmful, and there is equally in American life a lack of tradition which is harmful. Studies which should unite as does Professor Wenley's book the biographical element with the significant movements of the time would supply a much needed sense of the continuous ties that bind our present to the past. Few things would so well lend richness and distinction to the intellectual life, which in spite of vigor will be meager till it is fused with a sense of the labors and achievements of the bygone generations who have worn the roads along which we may press forward to new goals.

If I have said more about the book than about its subject, Professor Morris,

it is because to write of the latter in this place would be but to summarize the book itself. George Sylvester Morris was leaving Dartmouth College just as the Civil War was breaking out. Twenty years later he assumed the Chair of Ethics and History of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. In 1889 came his untimely death. During this period, a much greater transformation came over America than it is even yet possible to realize. Mr. Morris suffered the spiritual conflicts of the transition. For himself he achieved, by means of a combination of Greek and German thought, a triumphant reconciliation of traditional religion with rational intelligence, of the older New England individualism with devoted loyalty to the purpose and meaning of objective institutions, of moral faith with the pronouncements of science. This generation finds the solution too easy; the formula of reconciliation too much a product of desire; the combination too much a mixture of incompatible factors. But Mr. Morris's personality, his spirit, was a prophecy of the possibility of a true union of substantial tradition and the free life of thought. No person ever came under his influence without attaining a greater faith in both of these things. In education he was a power among the scholars of those days who led the American College away from its provincialism into broader fields of learning, and keener methods of criticism. His old pupils and friends will rejoice that his life has found such a worthy record, that others may also come within the range of his learning and charm.

JOHN DEWEY.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. New York, Columbia University Press, 1918. Volume I.—pp. 272.

The first study in this volume, by Mr. M. T. McClure, is on "Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy." Mr. McClure finds in Greek Philosophy three well-defined types of interest—the *scientific*, which is uppermost in the Milesians, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus; the *mystical*, which is uppermost in the Pythagoreans and Plato; and the *humanistic*, which leads to the problem of the adjustment of nature and convention, which, blending with the mystical interest, is central in Pythagoras, Plato (both in his political philosophy and his theory of knowledge), and in Aristotle. Heracleitus stands apart, "happily free from initial presuppositions and concerned with a description of the immediate." The paper concludes with a brief pragmatic criticism of absolutistic monism and the assertion that "Reality is a choice of values." The three motives of Mr. McClure are undoubtedly operative in Greek philosophy, but I cannot admit that philosophers can be classified in terms of their disjunction. Plato and Aristotle had strong scientific interests and Empedocles, for example, was not devoid of the mystical interest. Mr. McClure's criticism of absolutism is too meager to be of any value.

Mr. Walter Veazie, on "The Meaning of Φύσις in Early Greek Philosophy" makes an interesting collation of passages from Greek writers in support of

the view that "φύσις is the inner nature or essence of things, their potency, that in them which has the *power of motion in itself*."

Mr. W. T. Bush entitles his contribution "An Impression of Greek Political Philosophy." I am afraid the reader, unacquainted with Plato and Aristotle, would get from this paper an impression so hazy as scarcely to deserve the name. After a large number of citations from Greeks and moderns, Mr. Bush concludes that "the confusion and disorganization of Greek life are not likely to be exaggerated" and that this condition was a powerful motivation in the political thought of Plato. Doubtless! But Mr. Bush does not make even a slender contribution to our knowledge and understanding of Greek political thinking. His paper is not in any proper sense a study in the history of ideas.

Mr. John J. Coos, in a very slender contribution, calls attention to the fact that Francis Bacon had good ideas as to how the history of philosophy should be written.

Mr. Dewey, in "The Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy" makes out a good case for the view that Hobbes aimed at giving a rational and scientific foundation to morals and politics in order to free them from all subservience to divinity. Hobbes suffered from a false psychology, but he aimed to found an art of social control on a science of a human nature. Mr. Lord's paper "The Attempt of Hobbes to Base Ethics on Psychology" takes the same general standpoint and includes some good criticism of Hobbes's theory of the springs of human conduct. Mr. Albert G. A. Balz gives a comprehensive and clear account of "The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes" and, incidentally, contends that "the true intellectual progenitor of Hobbes is Galileo."

Mr. Roberts B. Owen has a paper on "Truth and Error in Descartes." Descartes holds that "to be true means to grasp the content of a static and determinate reality." Truth cannot change while experience may. Agreement with experience cannot be a test of truth; therefore, true ideas must copy reality; but there is no means, except clearness and distinctness, of determining whether ideas are true or not. "In order to validate such ideas the hypothesis of God is invoked." Therefore once an idea is true it is true always. Error must be due to the interference of the will. But, if this be the case, either will and intellect are not separable and ideas may be both clear and false, or intellect and will are absolutely separate and then one cannot influence the other at all. Thus error in the intellect becomes impossible. Mr. Owen makes no attempt either to trace the historical sources or the consequences of Descartes's doctrine of truth and error. Mr. Owen would have made a more instructive contribution if he had taken up the influence of scholasticism and the new mechanical theory of the universe on Descartes. The same criticism holds good, in lesser degree, of Mr. W. F. Cooley's "Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument," although here there is some reference to the Neo-Platonic Infinite and the scholastic *Ens Realissimum*. The influence of mathematics on Spinoza's thinking is not noticed.

Mr. Woodbridge, in his paper on "Berkeley's Realism," argues against the view that Berkeley was much influenced by Locke and for the view that Berkeley's chief motive was to defend "the realism of the common man reinforced by the nominalism of the philosopher"; "by refining the naive realism of the common man, the opposition between materialists and spiritualists is reduced to an absurdity." The thesis of the paper is well documented and argued. Nevertheless, I feel that, while Mr. Woodbridge's contention is largely correct, Berkeley's strongest motive after all was to furnish a plain and simple argument for God and immortality and that he was, above everything else, a theologically-minded philosopher. In the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and elsewhere he waxes enthusiastic over the irrefragable basis of religion that his philosophy affords.

Mr. A. L. Jones has "A Note on Thomas Brown's Contribution to Esthetics," a theory which he estimates highly.

Mr. Montague's discussion of "The Antinomy and its Implications for Logical Theory" is interesting and good. His criticisms of Ultra-Rationalism and Ultra-Empiricism are excellent. I do not feel that he does full justice to the relational view, which seems to me to be capable of being so stated as to include his own "Double Aspect View." But this paper, good in itself, is not at all a contribution to the *history of ideas*. The last paper, by Mr. H. T. Costello, on "Old Problems with New Faces in Recent Logic," contains a refreshing appreciation of Aristotle as an instrumentalist in logic and a just valuation of the biological-nominalist and mechanist-realist points of view in logic. By the latter he means the view that "nature is subject to precise laws." This standpoint, as he says, does not mean that everything in the world can be accounted for in terms of mechanics, physics and chemistry. He concludes with a convincing argument against the assumption, common to B. Russell and others, that the 'logical atomism' which would reduce reality to an aggregate of terms and relations wholly external to one another is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that both physical reality and conscious being, including thought itself, have determinate structures and modes of behavior which it is the business of the mind to find and not to make out of whole cloth. Both thinking and reality which is not thinking are systematic. There are many systems in the world, one supervening upon another. To all of this I heartily subscribe. The whole paper expounds a sound standpoint, but it is only in the vaguest sense historical.

In short, this volume, taken in its entirety, is misnamed. Contributions to the history of philosophy should be of two kinds—(1) Some or all of the leading ideas of a philosopher should be expounded, with abundant reference to his writings. The sources of these ideas, whether in previous thinkers or in the author's contemporaries or his other interests, intellectual or practical, should be followed out. The curve of his historical influence might well be plotted too. (2) Another fruitful historical method, of whose use in an elementary fashion and on a large scale Windelband's *History of Philosophy* is the best example, would be to trace the development of a leading idea through

a whole period or succession of periods; for example, the idea of nature, substance, law, right, cause, end, self, etc.; and to show the historical antecedents and consequences of the idea in question. Some of the papers in the present volume, notably those of Messrs. Dewey and Woodbridge, do conform to the first method. Others, such as that of Mr. McClure, attempt, with but meager results, the second method. Some are not historical in any proper sense of the term.

J. A. LEIGHTON.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

The Field of Philosophy. An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy. By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams & Co., 1918.—pp. xii, 414.

The author believes that a student's first course in philosophy should combine the historical and systematic methods of approach. He accordingly begins with a rapid survey of the most significant stages and types of philosophical thinking, starting with the primitive world view and including the early Greek philosophy, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, and Christian philosophy in ancient and medieval forms. The principal problems are thus in the first place presented in a manner that is both elementary and representative of their actual course of development in human thought. The problems which are then discussed in a more advanced way, from the modern standpoint, include that of substance (materialism, spiritualism, double aspect theory), the one and the many, evolution and teleology, and the self. An outline of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics (substance, causality, finality, individuality, space, time) and two chapters on the theory of knowledge follow. The closing three chapters treat of the various branches of philosophy in their relations to one another, the status of values, and the philosophy of history. The general standpoint of the book is idealistic. An appendix, however, gives accounts of the new realism, pragmatism, and of the philosophy of Bergson.

The principles on which the book is planned are excellent. First, the choice of topics is admirable. The topics treated are the very ones which, in the experience of the reviewer at least, undergraduates in their first course most wish to know something about. Secondly, the arrangement of material is pedagogically sound. The historical survey orients the student in the problems, and when he meets them for the second time in the latter half of the book he is ready to attack them with renewed interest and profit. Thirdly, the order of topics is rational. Each is made to lead to that which follows. The problem of knowledge is reserved until toward the last, the place where historically and pedagogically it belongs.

Mechanically, the book is in the main to be commended. Type and binding are attractive. The references at the end of each chapter are well chosen. The names of authors ought always to have been given in full (to save time fumbling over cards in library catalogues). The student should be told by

means of asterisks or in some other way, which of the references are meant for his use, and which for the use of his instructor. (*E. g.*, the works of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Joachim, *et al.*, cited after chap. XXII cannot be read with profit by a student in his first course in philosophy.)

The author says that the book has been primarily prepared for the use of classes in his own institution. As he proceeds, however, to express the hope that it may be found of service elsewhere, it may not be ungracious to point out some of the difficulties that may be found in the way of its adoption in some places. Many teachers will find the book altogether too condensed. The author describes it correctly as a "comprehensive outline—an extended syllabus—to be filled in by the teacher in his lectures and by the pupil in his collateral readings" (p. vi). It would be impossible for the student to grasp the thought of many chapters until they had been covered in lectures; and, even then, much would not be clear until he had completed his collateral reading. The chapters are short, and so far as the student's time is concerned, he could do some collateral reading in connection with every chapter, and this is apparently the author's intention. But few college and university libraries are well enough equipped in duplicate copies of books to make such a plan of study feasible for large classes like the first course in philosophy. The book would be more largely serviceable if the author would do one of two things: (1) enlarge the book to double its present size by the addition of illustrative material, but without adding a single topic (more already are included than could possibly be covered in one elementary course); or, (2) publish a 'source book' which would consist of supplementary material to be read in connection with each chapter in the text.

On the whole, the book is a valuable contribution. Every teacher of an introductory course in philosophy will get ideas from it that will help him to plan his own course; and perhaps many, like the undersigned (who has already tried it with a class), will conclude that, notwithstanding the difficulties in making use of it, it is the most practically available book for a course in the introduction to philosophy.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

A Study of Beliefs and Attitudes. The Psychology of Conviction. By JOSEPH JASTROW. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1918.—pp. xix, 387.

This is a collection of essays, most of them reprinted from periodicals, whose homogeneity lies in the fact that most of them discuss or illustrate some phase of the law that men's convictions are determined not by logical evidence but by desires, conscious or disguised, by imitation, and by other psychological forces. This thesis, which we all accept and nevertheless constantly ignore, Professor Jastrow exhibits to us from many points of view, with many felicities of phrase, and some forcible illustrations. The chapter which the present reviewer likes best, perhaps because it adds conciseness to its other merits,

is that on "The Will to Believe in the Supernatural," which begins with a delightful passage recalling the author's youthful and enforced study of "Butler's Analogy": "By the light of that benign essay I have again and again appreciated the comfort of sighting the terminus from the starting-point of a logical journey." It was Butler's work that "first revealed the commanding Supremacy of Conclusions, and the subsidiary function of premises."

In pursuance of his plan of studying the psychology of credulity by the 'case method,' the cases of Paladino, of Mrs. Eddy, of Taxil, of Caspar Hauser, or phrenology, and of Clever Hans are all discussed by Professor Jastrow; the essay dealing with Hans seems to have been written before the days of that animal's more mystifying successors Muhamed and Zarif. The last three essays have not been previously published: they treat of "The Psychology of Indulgence: Tobacco and Alcohol," of "The Feminine Mind," and of "Militarism and Pacifism," and do not relate at all immediately to the main theme of the book.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received:

Life and Finite Individuality. Two Symposia: I. By J. S. HALDANE, D'ARCY WENTWORTH THOMPSON, P. CHALMERS MITCHELL, and L. T. HOBHOUSE. II. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, G. F. STOUT, and VISCOUNT HALDANE. Edited for the Aristotelian Society with an Introduction by H. WILDON CARR. London, Williams and Norgate, 1918.—pp. 194.

Morale and Its Enemies. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1918.—pp. xv, 200.

Outlines of Social Philosophy. By J. S. MACKENZIE. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York, the Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. 280.

The New State. By M. P. FOLLETT. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918.—pp. vii, 377.

The Relation of John Locke to English Deism. By S. G. HEFELBOWER. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1918.—pp. viii, 188.

John Dewey's Logical Theory. By DELTON THOMAS HOWARD. Cornell Studies in Philosophy. No. 11. New York, Longman's Green and Co., 1918.—pp. iv, 135.

Education for Character. By FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP. Indianapolis, The Bobs-Merrill Company, 1917.—pp. 453.

La Psychologie de Stendhal. Par HENRI DELACROIX. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1918.—pp. 286.

Théorie Génétique de la Réalité. Le Pancalisme. Par JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Traduit par E. PHILIPPI. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1918.—pp. xiii, 332.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mlt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nèo-Sc.* = *Revue Nèo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Why is the 'Unconscious' Unconscious? (Symposium) I, MAURICE NICOLL; II, W. H. R. RIVERS; III, ERNEST JONES. Br. J. Ps., IX, 2, pp. 230–256.

I. Captain Nicoll's view is that the 'unconscious' is unconscious because the inexhaustible source of our psychic life is not yet fully adapted to reality. He follows Jung, who divides the unconscious into the *personal unconscious* (which for Freud is the unconscious) and the *collective unconscious* or racial unconscious. The contents of the collective unconscious are *primordial thought-feelings*, which are shared with all mankind. In the dream, the product of the unconscious, we find the forces of progression as well as those of regression. In the progressive evolution of life, the conscious mind gets adapted to reality through progressive transmutations of psychic energy carried on at levels beneath consciousness.

II. The aim of Rivers' contribution is to show that the unconscious is the home of instinct; and that mechanism, by which experience becomes and remains unconscious, is particularly connected with instinct. He asks two chief questions: (1) Why does experience become unconscious? His answer is that dissociation seems a process especially connected with instinctive modes of reaction. But in the higher animals and man dissociation is less complete. Here certain elements of the instinctive complex are suppressed, while others are combined with more discriminative modes of reaction. (2) Why, when experience becomes unconscious, does it persist in this dissociated state? The reply is that, through this process of dissociation, nature puts out of action instinctive reactions which interfere with mechanisms formed through a combination of instinct and intelligence.

III. Jones, following Freud, maintains that the 'unconscious' is unconscious owing to the inhibiting pressure of the affective factors known together as 'repression.' He notes that the chief feature of unconscious processes is that

the attempt to explore them is opposed by the subject. It is stated as a general law that what has a positive affective tone in the unconscious, has a negative affective tone in consciousness. This transformation of pleasure into displeasure is perhaps the most essential characteristic of repression. Freud traced the genesis of repression from two mental systems which precede the unconscious and the conscious. The primary system is dominated by the 'pleasure-pain principle'; the secondary, by the 'reality principle.' Repression arises through the conflict of these systems. Nicoll held the unconscious to be *not yet* adapted to reality. Rivers held it to be *no longer* adapted to reality. Jones holds that the unconscious is *sometimes* better adapted to reality than consciousness, and *sometimes not.*

MARIE T. COLLINS.

The Theory of Symbolism. ERNEST JONES. Br. J. Ps., IX, 2, pp. 181–229.

The thesis of this paper is that symbolism, in the strict sense, forms a distinct type of indirect representation; and that its clear differentiation throws light on the primitive levels in mental development and their relation to conscious thought. The attributes of *true* symbolism (as modified from Rank and Sachs) are: (1) representation of unconscious material; (2) constant meaning; (3) non-dependence on individual factors; (4) a phylogenetic and ontogenetic evolutionary basis; (5) linguistic connection between the symbol and the idea symbolized; (6) phylogenetic parallels between the symbolism of the individual and myths, cults and religions. The number of ideas symbolized is very limited compared to the endless number of symbols. There are less than a hundred ideas that can be symbolized. All these are found to relate to: the physical self, members of the immediate family, or to the phenomena of love, birth or death. They apparently arise as a result of regression from a higher level to a more primitive level of meaning. The 'real' or actual meaning of an idea is somehow lost temporarily, and the symbol is used to convey the meaning of a more primitive idea, to which it was once equivalent symbolically. Hence, when the meaning of the symbol is revealed, the conscious attitude is characterized by surprise, incredulity, often repugnance. The original identification at the base of every symbolism is suggestive of the fundamental tendency of primitive mind to note resemblances and not differences. Three factors are operative in this tendency: (1) mental incapacity, (2) the 'pleasure-pain principle,' (3) the 'reality principle'. Progress takes place *via* symbolic equivalents, and not *via* symbolism as held by the post-psycho-analytical school. Silberer may be critized for confusing the process of symbolic equivalency with that of symbolism. The essential function of symbolism, in its broadest sense, is to overcome the inhibition which hinders the free expression of a feeling-idea. If the regression which this involves proceeds only a certain way—remaining conscious—the result is metaphorical, or 'functional' symbolism. If the repression proceeds to the level of the unconscious, the result is *true* symbolism.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

L'Optimisme et la Science. A. LECLÈRE. Rev. de Mét., XXV., 4, pp. 433–473.

Optimism in regard to the continual progress of civilization should not be a matter of sentiment, but can only be satisfactorily based upon scientific investigation. A philosophy of history cannot avoid a preconceived finalism and, consequently, an unjustified optimism on the basis of little known and inexact facts. To envisage the principle of evolution as dominating all other laws is to interpret history as the study of a super-organism. To every historical fact is added some fantasy of the imagination, more or less metaphysically disguised, and a cause not rigorously positive is taken as the explanation of all causes, resulting in a monstrous confusion of scientific and arbitrary points of view. Only by pointing out certain well established facts in physics, physiology, psychology and sociology, can we determine whether optimism is justified in the field of morality. It is universally recognized that the most highly organized products of evolution as, for example, those of organic chemistry, are very unstable. And since morality is ultimately reducible to the physiological processes taking place in the nervous system, we find that its functionings are the most unstable and most precarious of all. For all development of a high order in the history of mankind is of a relatively recent date, and as that which is inherent in an organism for the shortest length of time is the least assimilated by it, future development is very uncertain and the most perfect form is the least stable. In every human being not pathologically tainted there still exist the two defects of fallibility and of susceptibility to immoral influences. The effect of ontogenetic and phylogenetic instincts will prevent the individual from perfecting himself. The only hope for a better state of morality is to re-create the human organism through a more complete and comprehensive knowledge of the laws which govern it. This moral medication can only be made possible by the development of the science of social therapeutics. The further science advances, the more plausible it seems that the nervous system and a knowledge of the physical laws that govern it are the ultimate irreducibles upon which the state of morality depends. A day perhaps will come in which practical morals will be based upon a systematic enumeration of all the physiological means of acting on the mind through the body. But a perfect knowledge of the totality of the laws of matter would connote a *quasi* divine knowledge, and we can, therefore, never hope for a perfect state of society. A truly moral man, from the point of view of physiology, will be far from a genius, but will be comparatively free from defects. The individuals who are only 'moral' through pusillanimity somewhat compensate for the highly intellectual natures who prefer isolation and consequently develop nervous psychoses. The present war has somewhat accelerated moral progress by promoting internationalism and by alleviating social antipathies. Education may be said to be the greatest means for social improvement because of its power to destroy the degenerate instincts of the uncultured. The majority of the evils that affect humanity are due to unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances, for which there are, theoretically speaking, certain remedies. In all cases

the body is the chief culprit, and the task of the future will be that of ameliorating certain undesirable human instincts through social therapeutic methods. A certain optimism is justifiable, as we can hope for a greater advance in the knowledge of psycho-neural diseases and their attendant causes. Scientific ardor may hope for a completely perfect man, but as knowledge is not omniscient, we must conclude that a modified pessimism is more justifiable than an unwarranted and absolute optimism as to the future of morality.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

The Larger Self. J. DASHIELL STOOPS. Int. J. E., XXIX, 1, pp. 1–7.

The racial as well as the individual aspect of the self should be taken into account in the effort to understand the place of the self in the scheme of life. The eighteenth century emphasized only the latter aspect, and hence regarded the individual as a unique self of will and reason externally related to society. But evolution has shown that, to interpret the self adequately, we must recognize also the former aspect and must realize that, because of his fundamental brain-patterns, the individual is organically related to his fellows. Thus, only the individual who regards himself as a part of an organic whole, who recognizes that his behavior must accord with the rough outlines of the instinctive action-patterns, and who identifies himself with the racial life,—only such an individual can be an end in himself.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Consciousness As Behavior. B. H. BODE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 17, pp. 449–453.

This article is an answer to certain objections brought by Dr. H. R. Marshall against the view that consciousness is to be interpreted as a form of behavior. The chief of these objections is that a study of behavior does not lead to consciousness; that the existence of consciousness is a matter of inference and not of objective observation. In reply, the author affirms that we observe by seeing things as existing in a certain context, and that the context is not a something supplied upon the basis of observation. Consequently, consciousness *can* be reached through purely objective observation.

I. CHASMAN.

Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method. B. H. BODE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 26, pp. 701–710.

The writer, who believes that philosophy is obliged "to aid in the creation and realization of human ideals, not in a realm apart, but in our everyday world of space and time and in the affairs of our common life," finds himself in disagreement with the philosophical method of Mr. Russell. In his recent book entitled *Mysticism and Logic*, Mr. Russell does not, indeed, deny the reality of time, but considers it philosophically unimportant. The reason for this view is that philosophy is not concerned with the accidental nature of things. While particular things *exist*, universals *subsist*, and philosophy should

be concerned with universals. This, however, takes philosophy out of the everyday world, and puts it in a realm apart, where it can do no one any good. Moreover, there is that separation of the world of universals and the temporal world found in Plato, and which presents the logical difficulty of some union between the two. Dr. Bode would turn philosophy from the realm of mathematical concepts to the world as it is.

I. CHASMAN.

Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic." BERTRAND RUSSELL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 1, pp. 5–26.

Mr. Russell here attempts to answer some of Professor Dewey's criticisms of him in the *Essays in Experimental Logic*. Professor Dewey has misunderstood him on several points. That is due to the fact that what Professor Dewey calls logic, he would consider a part of psychology. The ways in which we become possessed of what we call knowledge are not a part of logic but of psychology. In general, the criticism involves three points: (1) logical and psychological data; (2) instrumentalism; (3) the external world. In regard to the first, Mr. Russell deduces three propositions on the relation between the psychologically primitive data and the precise data of science. They are: (1) all that we learn through the senses is more or less vague; (2) what we learn by careful analytic attention of the scientific kind is less vague than what we learn by casual untrained attention; and (3) even the vaguest perception has *some* value for purposes of inference, but the vaguer it is the smaller becomes its value for inference. The value of this theory is threefold: (*a*) no perception can be so precise as to be incapable of greater precision, and no perception can be so vague as to be incapable of greater vagueness; (*b*) it allows *some* inferential value to even very vague data; and (*c*) it does not involve an Unknowable either at the beginning or at the end. These merits are not found in Professor Dewey's theory. Regarding Instrumentalism, there are four difficulties: (1) the "crude datum" of Professor Dewey lies outside of knowledge; (2) it assumes a knowledge of causal laws; (3) it ignores fundamental skepticism; and (4) it is opposed to contemplation except as a means to action, while contemplation, Russell believes, is worth while for its own sake. Finally, regarding the problem of the external world, Mr. Russell first defines his view and then answers some of Professor Dewey's criticisms on his view. Data are a certain collection of particulars and facts, and they are the total store from which, at the moment, the knowledge of the world is drawn. The external world lies outside the group of data,—where "outside" is used in the logical sense. The world of data differs from the world of common sense in three ways: (1) by extrusion of the notion of substance; (2) by including particular things only at the moment when each exists as a datum; and (3) by excluding everything of other people except their outward show.

I. CHASMAN.

Nerve Process and Cognition. EDWARD CHASE TOLMAN. Psych. Rev., XXV, 6, pp. 423–442.

The thesis presented here is that the cognition of a given object or stimulus consists in an internal neurological placing, involving an activity of the association neurones. Thus, the cognition of a given color involves the discharge into an association path of the excitation caused in the visual, cortical areas by the color. First, the common light paths in the cortex are developed and then are used in developing individual color paths, which are, therefore, closely connected with each other and with the common paths. Here, then, we have the commencement of a system in which, through the activity of any one path, the object causing this activity is placed with reference to the whole system. Further, with each differentiation of color, new association paths are formed, influencing and influenced by the old paths, so that there are eventually only compromise paths. Activity in any such paths due to a color stimulus is cognition neurologically interpreted. Moreover, the cognition of other sense qualities may be similarly explained and the cognition of objects more complex than sense qualities can also be ascribed to associative placing. The correlative of this associative placing is meaning, and meaning often has for its accompaniment the 'quale' or 'raw feel' of the quality. The 'raw feel' is caused by those sensory neurones which discharge into such association neurones as condition meaning. In remembering or thinking an object, a given 'raw feel' will not arise unless the association path connected with the particular sensory center which gives rise to that 'raw feel' produces excitation in the center. The conscious perception of more complex objects, such as chair, includes not merely the meaning *chair* but also the meanings of the individual sense qualities and further the 'raw feel' of each quality. In thinking or remembering *chair*, the excitation of association paths may produce excitation in the sensory centers which ordinarily discharge into them and these will in turn produce a 'raw feel.' Again, in the case of objects, such as the idea of finance, the process of cognition is similar, except that the general meaning is connected with definite sense qualities in ways variable with the individual. Thus, cognition, which we have explained neurologically, has, as its correlate, meaning which may be accompanied by a 'raw feel.'

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Professor Spaulding's Non-Existent Illusions. JAMES BISSELL PRATT. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 25, pp. 688–695.

Professor Spaulding insists that illusion, hallucination, and error must *not* be classed as mental. The reasons for this assertion are threefold: (1) illusions have an adequate causal explanation; (2) they consist in taking one entity to be another which it is not, or in localizing it in the wrong place or the wrong time; (3) they are not existents but mere subsistents. This leads to self-contradictions. If the bent stick as seen in water, for example, is physical and not mental, and if it be identical with the straight stick, then the same stick is both straight and not straight at the same time. If dreams be ruled

out of existence, and considered merely as subsisting, it would be necessary to rule out sensations as well; for Professor Spaulding's definition of existents as including matters mental as well as physical would apply to both. Hence, by attempting to rid the world of existents from error, hallucination, and illusion, Professor Spaulding has got into difficulties from which he is unable to extricate himself without overthrowing the very views on error which he tries to establish.

I. CHASMAN.

The Subject Matter of Formal Logic. MORRIS R. COHEN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 25, pp. 673–688.

If by logic is meant a clear, accurate, and orderly intellectual procedure, then the modern text-books on logic are highly illogical. Besides, the information they give on scientific methods is inaccurate. "Logical or formal truths are truths concerning the implication, consistency, or necessary connection between *objects* asserted in propositions and the distinctive subject-matter of logic may be said to be the relations generally expressed by *if—then necessarily.*" Formal logic does *not* consider the consequences of propositions apart from their meaning, as is usually supposed. From a proposition devoid of meaning nothing could be deduced. Logic deals with the elements or operations common to all sciences. The nature of the subject matter of logic is identical with the subject matter of pure mathematics. Formal logic is simply the study of the most general portion of pure mathematics. Formal logic is identical with deduction. As for induction, that "is either disguised deduction or more or less methodical guess-work."

I. CHASMAN.

The Ethics of Internationalism and the Individual. J. R. KANTOR. Int. J. E., XXIX, 1, pp. 29–38.

Most of the discussion concerning internationalism is futile because it fails to take account of concrete facts. The way to secure moral conduct on the part of nations is to make them realize the need of promoting the common welfare, of establishing and safe-guarding certain rights for all, and of interrelating benefits and obligations. Nations may be brought to such realization through organization. To obtain a genuine social organization, plans must be shaped with the individual and not the nation as the focal point; for only as there is coöperation among individuals who are conscious of their relation to and responsibility for other individuals is there genuine society. That is, to get a social organization, individuals and not nations must be brought into self-conscious coöperation. If the social order is to be harmoniously maintained, the individuals must reflect on their rights and obligations; for a moral society is based on the conscious formulation of ideas and moral sentiments. Thus society achieves progress only through the enlightenment of individuals. Hence education is essential; for the development of self-consciousness depends on an understanding of the historical, developmental

aspect of institutions and on the appreciation of economic values. The progress in such education would, of course, assume immense proportions, but the educational campaigns in the present war have given a hint of what might be accomplished through coöperation. It has also become evident, during the war, that governmental problems are problems of the people and that the individual is the important factor in group activity. Hence, when a league of nations that is a league of peoples has been effected, we may hope for morality among states.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Angelus Silesius: A Seventeenth Century Mystic. FREDERIC PALMER. Har. Theo. Rev., XI, 2, pp. 171–202.

Johann Scheffler, afterwards known as Angelus Silesius, is interesting for the completeness with which he represents the position of mysticism. He was a Lutheran by birth and education, took his doctor's degree in philosophy and medicine in 1649, then became court physician at Oels in Württemberg. Here the ecclesiastical atmosphere was uncongenial, so in 1583 he abandoned it and entered the Roman Catholic Church. Becoming a member of the Franciscan Order, he was consecrated a priest. Then it was that some of his Protestant friends circulated scurrilous songs attacking him. Thus began a controversy which lasted many years and finally ended in his resignation. In 1671 he retired to a monastery at Breslau where he spent his time editing books and communing with his soul. His hymns have kept his name alive, but later thinkers have discovered the importance of mysticism in his work. In the *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* he develops the idea that God is forever endeavoring to pour himself into us, and to give us all of himself that we are capable of receiving. The character of the soul not only determines its status, but is its status. In setting forth the means by which this union with God is to be attained Silesius emphasizes the central doctrine of mysticism—dualism. Man must empty himself of all that is characteristic of humanity; the more completely he succeeds in self-annihilation, the more completely he becomes one with God. Yet he insists that this does not abolish personality, which persists after death. He likens the presence of God in all that is His to the presence of the number one in all the other numbers. Like all mystics he holds that the knowledge of God comes through intuition. The conviction flashes upon the soul with a clearness and intensity which is its own assurance. The deepest intercourse between mind and mind is not limited by the senses, but far transcends word or sight. So the communications of the spirit are like the wind, of which "thou canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth." Angelus Silesius was a man who sought to lose himself in God.

EMILY A. LANE.

NOTES.

The *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January–February announces the death of Dr. Gaston Milhaud, teacher and writer on philosophical subjects. Since 1909 he has lectured at the Sorbonne on the History of Philosophy in its relation to the sciences. He was the author of a number of books, among which are: *Études sur la pensée scientifique chez les Grecs et les modernes* and *Nouvelles Études sur l'histoire de la pensée scientifique.*

On February 11 occurred the death of Dr. Paul Carus, editor of the *Open Court* and *The Monist*, and the author of numerous philosophical articles and books.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXIX, 2: *A. E. Heath*, International Politics and the Concept of World Sections; *H. M. Kallen*, "In the Hope of the New Zion"; *I. W. Howerth*, The Great War and the Instinct of the Herd; *Roger Sherman Loomis*, A Defense of Naturalism; *Thomas D. Eliot*, The Creation of Souls; *Maurice de Wulf*, The Society of Nations in the Thirteenth Century.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XV, 26: *B. H. Bode*, Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method.

XVI, 1: *Bertrand Russell*, Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic."

XVI, 2: *Albert G. A. Balz*, The Use and Misuse of History; *Margaret Floy Washburn*, "Dualism in Animal Psychology"; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Doctrinal Functions; *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, Of Outer-World Objects.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXVI, 1: *J. R. Kantor*, Psychology as a Science of Critical Evaluation; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, Chromatic Thresholds of Sensation from Center to Periphery of the Retina and their Bearing on Color Theory, Part I; *F. A. C. Perrin*, The Learning Curves of the Analogies and the Mirror Reading Tests; *Clark L. Hull* and *Robert B. Montgomery*, An Experimental Investigation of Certain Alleged Relations between Character and Handwriting; *C. H. Griffitts* and *W. J. Baumgartner*, The Correlation between Visualization and Brightness Discrimination.